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Hobby Lobby, Birth Control and Our ongoing Cultural Wars: Pleasure and
Desire in the Crossfires

Birth control has re-emerged as a political, legal and constitutional
conundrum – maybe obsession – echoing its first such emergence fifty years ago, in
the middle of the 1960s. Underlying the legal battles culminating in the Hobby
Lobby 1 decision from last term, is a “culture war” that features familiar antagonisms
– antagonisms that some of us might have thought – wrongly -- had abated – that
first rose to constitutional prominence in Griswold v Connecticut 2 and Eisenstadt v
Baird, 3 in 1965 and 1972 respectively. The parallels are striking. Thus, today, as
then, social conservatives assert a religious or moral commitment to a traditional
understanding of the nexus between marriage, sexuality and child-raising, and fear
that birth control technologies threaten that nexus, while women seeking
enhancement of their health and control over their fertility, as well as couples and
individuals seeking sexual expression freed of the anxieties of conception and
pregnancy, find birth control both fully adequate, and necessary, to the fulfillment of
both ends. Today, as then, one side or the other in this cultural war first uses
ordinary law to protect or reflect their interests: then, opponents sought to ban the
use of birth control through state laws criminalizing its prescription or use, 4 and
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
4 The statutes at issue in Griswold were CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32 and 54-196 (1958
rev.).
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Section 53-32 says: “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument
for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or
imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and
imprisoned.”
Section 54-196 says: “Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or
commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he
were the principal offender.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
The statute at issue in Eisenstadt was MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 21.

Section 21 says “whoever . . . gives away . . . any drug, medicine, instrument or article
whatever for the prevention of conception,” will receive a maximum five-year term
of imprisonment, except as authorized in § 21A. Under § 21A, “[a] registered
physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles
intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. [And a] registered
pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or
1

today, proponents seek to guarantee its accessibility through mandating its
coverage in insurance policies provided by employers, as required by the Affordable
Care Act. 5 And, today, as then, the antagonists burdened by these ordinary laws
then seek the protection of the Courts, who in turn employ some “higher” source of
law to protect their interests, beliefs, or liberties from the lower law that threatens
them: then, would-be birth control users and prescribers implored the Court to
apply the Constitution and its privacy-protecting penumbras to protect them against
the effect of state laws that had criminalized their prescription and use; today,
religious objectors prod the Court to invoke the protection of the twenty-five year
old Religious Freedom Restoration Act 6 -- itself enacted to codify into law a
discarded understanding of the First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty 7 -against the impact of the newly enacted Affordable Care Act, arguing that the
cooperation in the distribution of birth control to their employees required of them
by the Act would embroil them in complicity with a grave sin, and thus burden their
religious practice. And of course, then as now, the Supreme Court stepped in and
settled the legal dispute: then, by finding a constitutional right to use birth control in
the privacy-enhancing penumbra of various constitutional guarantees, 8 and now, by
finding a legal right, grounded in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, for
religiously motivated employers to opt out of the offending regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, which otherwise require employers to provide
insurance that covers the provision of birth control to their employees. 9
There is, though, a major difference between the cultural, legal and
constitutional wars around birth control of the nineteen-sixties and our
contemporary birth control wars, which has gone relatively unnoticed at least in the
legal literature, beyond the reversal of the lineup of the sides looking to deploy a
higher law – either the law emanating from constitutional penumbras, or broad
interpretations of the quasi-constitutional Religious Freedom Restoration Act -- so
as to control the impact of ordinary law that impinges on beliefs or freedoms. Then,
at least by the end of that decade, the two major sides to the birth control wars as
they played out in the courts had converged on a shared understanding of what I
will refer to as the “social meaning,” or point, of birth control; where they differed, of
course, was over its value. But they more or less agreed on what birth control is.
For both groups, birth control was understood to be a group of technologies that
would artificially prevent or interrupt conception, and which, by so doing, would
allow women to control their own fertility, and would allow heterosexual men and
articles to any married person presenting a prescription from a registered
physician.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-441 (1972).
5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(124 Stat.) 892.
6 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq.
7 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760-61 (2014); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-1.
8 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-455.
9 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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women to enjoy a sexual liberty unconstrained by anxiety or fears of conception. 10
It would do other things as well. It would, for example, enhance the health of some
women, particularly those who had already had multiple pregnancies, and for whom
an additional pregnancy might be dangerous or life threatening. 11 And, it would
facilitate some degree of “family planning” by married couples seeking to control the
spacing and size of their families. 12 But all participants in those earlier birth control
wars concurred that birth control, and particularly the newly invented and highly
effective pill, would primarily allow women, whether married or not, much greater
control of fertility, and would permit all heterosexuals much greater sexual liberty.
For some would-be users, the enhancement of women’s control over fertility was
what was central, and for others, it was the freer sex. And, for some moral and
religious objectors, the prospect of individual control of fertility is what was
grievous – marital sex should always be open to the conception of life, or at least to
the risk of it, and to try to reduce that risk to zero is sinful – while for others, the
enhancement of sexual freedom was what was most objectionable – sex unburdened
by the possibility of conception is a form of immoral and intolerable licentiousness,
accompanied by a host of social harms. But all sides agreed that birth control
promised two central things -- control of fertility and sexual liberty -- and that the
promises were linked: control of fertility, and the freedom from anxiety over
reproduction, would as a consequence promote greater sexual liberty. This set of
promises is what I’m referring to as birth control’s “social meaning,” and it was that
agreed social meaning that eventually informed the Court’s decisions regarding
constitutional issues surrounding its use.
That social meaning, and certainly the consensus around it, has virtually
disappeared from our current legal debates about access to birth control, and the
existence or scope of claimed exemptions from various duties to provide insurance
that covers it. We hear virtually no mention of it, either in the Hobby Lobby decision
itself or in our debates regarding it. The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby makes no
mention whatsoever of either the control of fertility or the liberation of sexual
expression as intrinsic to the point of birth control, and even Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent contains only one brief reference to the control of fertility, and the
importance of that control to women’s equality, 13 and no references at all to sexual
expression, as part of birth control’s value. She focused instead, as did both the ACA

For a thorough legal history of the movement toward constitutionalizing a right to
use birth control, See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). For
a social and political history of the movement for access to birth control, see LINDA P.
GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT: BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (New York:
Penguin Books, 1990) updated in LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A
HISTORY OF THE POLITICS OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (2007)
11 GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY at 94-95; GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN at
291.
12 This was the use of birth control emphasized and explicitly protected in Griswold.
Griswold, at 496.
13 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10
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and the HHS regulations governing the birth control mandate itself, on the health
needs of women for whom pregnancy could be injurious or life-threatening. 14 So,
birth control, as a means by which healthy women, whether married or not, can
control fertility, and likewise, birth control as a way to free the sexual expression of
anyone, male or female, who wishes to engage in sexual activity free of the risks, and
fears of the risks, of conception, just doesn’t make an appearance. The scholarly
literature on Hobby Lobby, both preceding the decision and in its wake, has followed
suit. Again, save the occasional article in the popular press, there is virtually no
discussion in the sizeable cottage industry of Hobby Lobby legal commentary, 15 and
rarely even an acknowledgement, of what birth control is, for the vast majority of
users and objectors both: for many women, a means of limiting fertility, whether or
not a pregnancy would be health or life threatening, and for perhaps an even larger
number of men and women both, a way of facilitating sexual liberty, free of both the
anxiety and the risks of reproduction.
Nor do we hear much of the arguments for or against birth control that
presuppose that understanding of birth control’s point, in the legal, cultural and
political discussions that have surrounded Hobby Lobby. We don’t hear much, for
example, in this round of our battles over birth control, of the virtues or vices of our
changing demographics as family sizes shrink, or of the value of the entry of women
into the workplace, prompted, in part, by their control of their own fertility, which is
in turn facilitated by birth control, or of the greater participation of large numbers of
men in parenting their young children that is tied to the same social developments.
We don’t hear much of the lack of censure or stigma attached to the status of either
childlessness or illegitimacy. We are not asked, in our current legal and
constitutional debates, to imagine the difficulties or unfairness of lives consumed by
a cycle of continual and unwanted pregnancies, breastfeeding, and the raising of
small children, occupying for many the course of an entire adult life, from the onset
of menstruation to death, much less of lives severely shortened by that fate, rather
than the reproductive lives so many of us enjoy, courtesy of birth control: lives
punctuated by the arrival of much wanted children occupying a central part of a life,
but a life that is also occupied by work, leisure and adult civic and cultural pursuits.
We don’t hear Loretta Lynn’s or Matt McGinn’s strong country voice: “The pill, the
pill/ I’m pining for the pill/ I’ll never have anymore/ because they’re going to bless
the pill” 16 –he was wrong on that last part – widely credited by health organizations
with having done more to educate rural women, in the nineteen seventies and
eighties, on their reproductive options than any education or public health
Id. at 2799.
Much of the progressive commentary on Hobby Lobby has focused not on the ACA
per se, but on the weaknesses and vagueness in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
and the result oriented decision making which the act prompts. See, e.g., Ira Lupu,
Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 35 (2015).
16 MATT MCGINN, The Pill, on HONESTY IS OUT OF THE FASHION (Transatlantic XTRA
1968); PETE SEEGER, The Pill, on PETE SEEGER: A LINK IN THE CHAIN (Columbia/Legacy
1996); LORETTA LYNN, The Pill, on BACK TO THE COUNTRY (MCA Records 1972).
14
15
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campaign before or since. 17 We hear even less – we don’t hear anything really -- of
the value of the sexual expression that is facilitated by the liberation of heterosexual
intercourse from the risks and concerns of unwanted pregnancies. On the other side
of the ledger, we don’t hear much of the moral wrongs that birth control qua birth
control either constitutes or facilitates, according to its socially conservative critics.
We are not being asked, in this round of our debates, to try to imagine, or at least
understand, what’s wrong with a sexuality in which the body is used as an
instrument for pleasure untied to the particular moral end of conception, or of the
host of social harms, from the difficulties of unwed parenthood to the spectacle of a
sex-saturated popular culture thrust on the interested and uninterested alike, that
might emanate from that use. We hear absolutely nothing of radical feminist
objections to birth control – objections that have been present as a constant
counterpoint to both liberal and liberal feminist campaigns endorsing it from the
middle of the nineteenth century to the early decades of this one: the claim, that is,
that birth control, both the nineteenth century and twentieth and twenty first
century versions, frees up, mostly, male exploitation and control of female sexuality,
and that while it may indeed deliver control of fertility, without real equality, it
delivers that control into male, not female hands. 18 To sum this up, we don’t hear
much, if anything, of the notion that birth control, again precisely because it
facilitates the control of fertility and promotes sexual liberty, is either a boon to
mankind for its contribution to women’s equality or health, free sexual expression,
or family planning, or a dire threat, because of its destruction of the nexus of family,
marriage, sexuality and conception, the belief to which it gives rise of a false
equivalence of sexuality with sport or expression or play, or its facilitation of greater
rather than lesser male control, commodification and exploitation of female
sexuality. In part, this massive censorial silencing of any discussion of the social
meaning of birth control reflects a more general phenomenon: we don’t hear much
of the substance of any serious arguments for or against birth control. But our
censorial instincts on this score seem greatest with respect to the social meaning
that Griswold and Eisenstadt jointly implied: that the use and dispensation of birth
control is protected by an individual right to privacy, and it is so protected precisely
because it both facilitates the control of fertility and opens the doors to sexual
liberty unconstrained by anxiety stemming from the risks of conception.
A full assessment of this odd silence in our social-sexual discourse is largely
beyond the scope of this article (maybe we’ve just grown weary of the debate), but
Rock Hall, Spotlight Exhibit: Loretta Lynn, THE ROCK HALL BLOG, THE ROCK AND ROLL
HALL OF FAME AND MUSEUM (Feb. 10, 2:30 PM),
http://rockhall.com/blog/post/7268_spotlight-exhibit-loretta-lynn-women-whorock/#sthash.14ZxePrf.dpuf.
18 On 19th century feminist objections to birth control and abortion, see GORDON, THE
MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN; on 20th century objections, see Catharine MacKinnon,
Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW (Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1987); Catharine MacKinnon,
Abortion: On Public and Private, in TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989).
17
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at least three reasons for it are purely legalistic, and a function of the Hobby Lobby
case itself, and merit a brief mention here. The first, and maybe the most central,
concerns the interests at stake and the parties representing those interests in Hobby
Lobby. The Green and Hahn families who challenged the ACA’s birth control
regulations only objected to those methods of birth control that they believed to be
abortifacients, thus mooting any larger argument regarding the immorality of birth
control generally. The families’ objection to those forms of birth control, in other
words, was not that birth control per se is immoral, but rather, that the forms of
birth control to which they objected effectively constituted an “abortion” and were
therefore immoral --– they destroy a human life. 19 There was no reason, for
purposes of that piece of litigation, to assert the deeper and broader argument
against birth control qua birth control put forward by both the Catholic Church and
now accepted by a number of social conservatives – although the Court gives no
indication that the outcome would be or will be any different, once the broader
objection is raised. On the other side, the Affordable Care Act itself and the
regulations regarding the coverage of birth control, characterized birth control as an
enhancement of women’s health, akin to other forms of preventative care such as
cancer screenings and mammograms. Again – at least in Hobby Lobby, the
government made no mention of family planning, control of fertility, or sexual
expression, as key to the service the regulation covers. 20 So, one side in Hobby
Lobby construed birth control as an abortifaciant and the other as a health
enhancement – neither construed it, much less discussed it, as any technology –
whether or not it is believed to cause an abortion -- the point of which is to control
fertility or liberate sexual expression or both, and for healthy and unhealthy people
alike.
Second, in one of the opinion’s most peculiar moments, the majority
accepted in one fell swoop and without elaboration the government’s compelling
interest in assuring the accessibility of birth control to those who would choose to
use it, obviating apparently any need to discuss what that compelling interest might
be. 21 Why does the government have a compelling interest in ensuring access to
birth control? And, what is that interest? The opinion provides no clue. There was
absolutely no discussion of this question – which one might sensibly think central -in the majority opinion; there didn’t need to be, the majority reasoned, because the
government had not used the least restrictive means of fulfilling it, whatever that
interest might be. 22 This was an odd lacuna and was by no means logically required:
the Court could just as easily have asserted the clear need to discuss both the
existence and the nature of the government’s compelling interest precisely in order
to reach the “least restrictive means” analysis. But they didn’t, and because they
didn’t, there was no discussion of the merits of any argument for the importance of
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66.
Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, Sibelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2013) (No. 13-354).
21 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
22 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2780-82.
19
20

6

birth control or for its accessibility, whether grounded in the control of fertility,
women’s equality, women’s health, or sexual liberty.
And third, the logic of the right won in Hobby Lobby – the right to be exempt
from what is otherwise a law of general applicability because of a religious belief -much like the right of privacy constructed fifty years ago in Griswold – the right to a
practice criminalized by an otherwise valid law -- quite generally resists the
elaboration of moral arguments for the behavior or belief that the right in question
seeks to exempt from regulation. Both rights – the constitutional right to use birth
control, and the RFRA right to be exempt from a health regulation that requires the
cooperation of employers in its dispensation -- like a number of other substantive
due process and first amendment rights recognized over the past two decades, are
clear examples of what I have elsewhere called “exit rights” 23: they grant their
holder the right to exit some socially, politically or legally constructed project,
because of individual disagreement with that project’s end or purpose. 24 Elsewhere,
I’ve contrasted these “exit rights” with earlier generations of legal and constitutional
“rights of entry,” such as integrationist rights and (most) civil rights, and then
criticized the former for their anti-democratic and anti-communitarian character. 25
Thus, the first and fourteenth amendment Yoder-styled “right to homeschool”
fervently sought (although not yet won) by some religious parents, 26 the first and
fourteenth amendment rights of individuals – obliquely recognized by Justice
Roberts -- to exempt themselves from the ACA’s mandate to purchase health
insurance, 27 the second amendment rights of gun owners to extract themselves
from the social compact, and privatize the most quintessentially public duty of
Robin West, Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 893 (2014); Robin West, Toward a
Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen Katz eds., University of Michigan
Press 2014); Robin West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 713 (2011).
24 Robin West, Freedom of the Church and our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the
Social Contract (forthcoming).
25 Robin West, Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts, in A NATION OF
WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen
Katz eds., University of Michigan Press 2014).
26 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Jonathan L. v. Super. Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr.
3d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Michael E. Hersher, “Home Schooling” in California, 118
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 27 (2008); Robert Reich, On Regulating Homeschooling: A Reply
to Glanzer, 58 EDUC. THEORY 17 (2008); Robert Reich, Why Homeschooling Should Be
Regulated, in HOMESCHOOLING IN FULL VIEW: A READER, 109 (Bruce S. Cooper, ed.,
Information Age Publishing 2005); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Off The Grid: Constitutional
Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (2008).
27 Roberts attributes this individual right– a right to not make commercial
purchases, even if the refusal to make such a purchases impacts interstate
commerce, and thus to be free of law requiring such purchases -- to the meaning of
our “Constitutional Order.”
23
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policing against violence, 28 the first amendment rights of workers to not support the
political work of the unions that represent them, 29 and perhaps paradigmatically,
the first amendment rights of religious churches, schools and hospitals to exempt
themselves from obligations imposed by the Civil Rights Acts for purposes of their
ministerial staffs 30 - all of these rights, like both the “right to privacy” constructed
by the Court in Griswold and the exemption from otherwise binding obligations
constructed in Hobby Lobby, permit the right holder to exit some aspect of our social
compact. 31 As these exit rights proliferate, and as their logic of exit becomes
ubiquitous and even defining – as “exit” becomes how we think of and about rights –
our constitutional discourse drifts, or lurches, toward a consensus around a
disturbingly fractured conception of community and democracy both.
Here, my point is considerably narrower, and purely descriptive. Like
virtually all exit rights, both the right to privacy constructed by Griswold, and the
right to an exemption from the ACA recognized by Hobby Lobby, are constructed in
such a way that the moral argument for the behavior for which either the
exemption, on the one hand, or the protective right of privacy on the other, is
sought, becomes inaccessible, virtually by design. To have an “exit right” just is, in
effect, to also have a right to be exempt from the need to defend or even explain the
behavior or the belief the exit protects. Moral and political arguments, like
conscience itself, become profoundly privatized. Thus, the privacy right constructed
in Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe, constitutionally protects not only the right to use
birth control or procure an abortion, but also protects from scrutiny the reasons one
might have for doing so. In Hobby Lobby, the exemption sought and won similarly
protects more than the refusal to participate in the provision of birth control to
one’s employees. It also protects the Hahns’ and Greens’ assertion that the
particular oral contraceptives and IUDs which they found offensive are in fact
abortifacients from critical examination, even though that claim was not just
contested but aggressively denied by the medical community, 32 as well as their

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008); Robin West, Tale of Two
Rights, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 893 (2014).
29 Amanda: please look at my piece Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil rights Act,
which is up on SSRN (the book is not yet out, I thought it was….).
30 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
31 Robin West, Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts, in A NATION OF
WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen
Katz, eds., University of Michigan Press 2014).
32 Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751(2013) (No. 13-354).
(arguing that “scientific evidence confirms that FDA-approved forms of emergency
contraception are not abortifacients….” and “a ‘contraceptive’ refers to that which
prevents fertilization of an egg or prevents implantation of a fertilized egg- in other
words, it prevents a pregnancy from taking place. ‘Emergency contraception’ (EC)
refers to a drug or device used after intercourse, but before pregnancy, to prevent
pregnancy from occurring.” When looking at emergency contraceptives… effects are
28
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belief that their role in the distribution of these devices would burden their religious
practices, 33 even though whether or not a legal requirement constitutes a burden,
under older First Amendment doctrine, is a legal and not a factual question,
requiring a judicial resolution. 34 More broadly, RFRA’s logic of “exemption” and the
Court’s interpretation of that logic, combined with Griswold and Eisenstadt’s logic of
“privacy,” have shrouded not only the use of birth control from criminal sanction,
and the decision not to cooperate in the provision of birth control to one’s
employees from legal interference, but have also exempted the arguments of both
sides supporting those decisions from any sort of critical engagement. That
reticence, now constitutionally and legally sanctioned, seems to have spread to the
commentary. There’s quite a bit that we just don’t talk about, when we talk about
Hobby Lobby, simply by virtue of the fact that we have legalized, and to some degree
constitutionalized, the terms of debate. Birth control’s social meaning and
arguments for and against its use that presuppose that meaning, seem to be within
that sphere of silence. That silence, in fact, may turn out to be part of Hobby Lobby’s
lasting legacy.
But whatever the reasons for it (and whatever the motivation for it) this
distinctive and very modern silence from the Court, the litigants themselves, and the
scholars who have written on the case, regarding the strength of the various
arguments for the use, misuse, or nonuse of birth control is itself unfortunate. First,
it cedes the territory of contestation over birth control’s social meaning to the Rush
Limbaughs of the world: when discussion of birth control’s social meaning does
occur, it is accompanied by contempt and derision. 35 But there is a broader and a
deeper problem that goes well beyond tone and the civility or incivility of our
discourse. Arguments for and against birth control, claimed with varying degrees of
explicitness over the last half-century, rest on competing conceptions of sexual
morality – and more specifically, on competing conceptions of heterosexual morality
-- which in turn affect the quality of our sexual and reproductive lives. Thus, it is not
just the various arguments for or against the use of birth control, but also the
conceptions of heterosexual and reproductive morality on which those arguments
pre-pregnancy and thus, not abortifacients. IUDs release copper ions that alter
endometrial lining. These alterations prevent implantation, rather than disrupting
it. Further evidence shows that when taken post-ovulation, emergency
contraceptives have no effect on preventing pregnancy. This is because the
contraceptive is most effective when taken before the luteinizing hormone surge,
which triggers the ovulatory process. Conclusion: emergency contraceptives
approved by the FDA “do not interfere with pregnancy and are not abortifacients,
because they are not effective after a fertilized egg has successfully implanted in the
uterus.”)
33 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
34 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2798.
35 Todd Gregory & Chelsea Rudman, Limbaugh Launched 46 Personal Attacks On
Fluke; He Apologized For Two Words, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Mar. 5, 2012, 7:08 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/research/2012/03/05/limbaugh-launched-46-personalattacks-on-fluke/184269.
9

rest, that have become shrouded in a haze of constitutionally protected spheres of
privacy and legally protected exemptions. We argue instead over the existence,
scope, content and logic of those exemptions and privacies. As a result of all of this,
to switch metaphors for a moment, we’ve effectively put not only the reasons that
moral and religious objectors oppose the use of birth control, and the reasons so
many of us have for wanting to use it, but also the competing conceptions of
heterosexual morality that respectively ground those reasons, in a legal and
constitutional black box. To the considerable degree that our constitutional
discourse determines the scope of our social and political discourse, we’ve put both
the arguments themselves, and the conceptions of sexual morality on which they
rest, not only out of the permissible bounds of legal argument, but out of the realm
of social, political and moral contestation as well.
This essay seeks to reverse this trend, simply by entering the breach. In the
four sections that follow, I first briefly examine, and then criticize, each of two of the
major arguments – which are by no means the only arguments -- that I believe have
largely motivated opposition to birth control, on the one side, and support of its use
on the other, for at least the last half-century, and the conception of heterosexual
morality on which each of these two arguments depends. In the first two of those
four sections, I will take up and then criticize what I will call (following common
usage) the “neo-natural lawyers’ argument” against the use of birth control within
marriage, first made in a papal encyclical in the 1930s, and then more recently, over
the last twenty years, and in a form entirely accessible to (and intended for) a
secular audience, in a number of law review articles by prominent contemporary
legal philosophers, including John Finnis, Robert George and George Bradley. In the
third and fourth sections, I look at and criticize a “sexual-libertarian” (hereafter,
sometimes, “libertarian” for short) argument for the use of birth control. The sexual
libertarian’s brief for birth control, unlike the natural lawyer’s brief against it, does
not have a canonical text, or set of canonical texts. Rather, the libertarian argument I
will first construct and then criticize, although sometimes explicit, is for the most
part largely implied by a host of claims about sexual morality and sexual autonomy
made over the last half century: first (and quite obliquely) by the liberal jurists in
Griswold and Eisenstadt themselves, followed, decades later, by somewhat more
explicit claims of the same nature in Lawrence, 36 and ultimately by scores of liberal,
liberal feminist, libertarian, pro-sex, queer and libertine political activists and legal
theorists since then. Again, to be clear, not all of these activists, jurists, and scholars
make the particular argument for birth control that I will construct and then
criticize; indeed many of them – maybe most of them -- don’t address birth control
at all, for reasons I will discuss. Rather, my claim will be that the nevertheless widely
accepted – even if rarely articulated -- sexual libertarian argument for birth control
that I will construct and criticize is not a strawman; it is expressed by some and
quite clearly implied – and, I believe, assumed -- by the various explicit claims made
about sexual and heterosexual morality by all of these political actors, legal scholars,
liberal jurists, and liberal, libertarian, and libertine political thinkers.
36

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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In both sections, my critical focus will be not only on the competing
arguments against or for birth control put forward by neo-natural laws and sexual
libertarians respectively, but also on the competing conceptions of heterosexual
morality that underlie each of the two sides’ arguments. I will eventually argue that
both the natural lawyer’s and the sexual libertarian’s conceptions of sexual morality
are problematic, and that, for all their differences, they are problematic in a
strikingly similar way: the conception of heterosexual morality held by each side,
on which their competing arguments for the immorality or utility of birth control
depends, conditions the morality of heterosexual sex in very different ways, but in
both cases they do so in ways that give very short shrift to women’s actual felt
desires, either for the sex itself, or for the pregnancy, or both. Thus, the natural
lawyer’s major argument against birth control rests on a conception of heterosexual
morality that celebrates all non-contracepted (or procreative) marital sex and all
the pregnancies that sex causes, regardless of whether the wife desires either the
sex itself or the pregnancy that is its entirely foreseeable result, while the sexual
libertarian celebrates all non-procreative sex that is “consensual,” or autonomous,
regardless of a woman or girl’s desire or lack of desire for the sex, or the pregnancy
that might – because of either the failure or misuse or nonuse of birth control -result. These are consequential omissions, both in terms of the two sides’
arguments for or against birth control, and more broadly. Conceptions of sexual
morality ground ways of living and being in the world: they are manifested in our
sexual expectations of ourselves and each other, in our modes of sexual behavior, in
our reproductive decisions, in our understanding of and relation to our own
reproductive labor, and most fundamentally in our self understandings – self
understandings that in turn inflect our nonsexual as well as our sexual interactions.
They impact what we ask of ourselves and our sexual partners, what we mean and
what we achieve when we aim for sexual satisfaction, how we experience our
pregnancies, and how we regard the joys and sorrows we undergo when raising our
children. The conceptions of sexual morality that we hold and act on affect how we
live, in other words, as well as what we believe. What I want to urge here is that at
least two of our modern conceptions of heterosexual morality as well as the
behavior they ground – including the use or nonuse of birth control – in spite of all
of their striking differences, conceive of moral heterosexual sex as sex that occurs in
spite of a woman’s lack of desire for the sex or the pregnancies that might result. As
such, they impose quite real harms on many women and some men, and of a notably
similar sort.
My conclusion is that behind the constitutional veil of privacy protected by
Griswold and Eisenstadt and celebrated by sexual libertarians, and behind the legal
exemption recognized by Hobby Lobby and treasured by social conservatives and
their neo- natural lawyer advocates, lie claims about the morality of heterosexuality
and reproduction that run roughshod over women’s felt pleasures and women’s felt
desires regarding both. The resulting practices, including the use or nonuse of birth
control, are thus grounded in claims and practices surrounding heterosexuality that
undergird not only the blossoming of life, as per the natural lawyers’ claim, or sexual
liberty, as per the libertarian’s, but also quite concrete conditions for women’s
subordination, both in traditional marriage and in the larger secular and sexualized
11

culture. Our current legalistic clashes over birth control marginalize these claims,
and thereby obfuscate those harms, and the subordination those harms entail. This
article seeks to at least put these arguments, along with the extremely problematic
conceptions of heterosexual morality on which they rest and the political and
psychic harms they may occasion, back on the table.
a. The Natural Lawyers’ Brief Against Birth Control

Without contraception, hetero, penetrative, vaginal-penile sexual intercourse
relatively predictably leads to conceptions, many of which eventually blossom into
full pregnancies and then live births. The contemporary neo-natural lawyers’ brief
against the use of birth control, first made in a papal encyclical in 1930, has centered
on the claim that both those sexual acts and the blossoming of life to which they
lead, and not the pleasure which may happily be their byproduct or the love they
may cement, is the very point of marriage itself, at least when marriage is properly
understood. 37 Contrary to the Court’s claim in Eisenstadt that a marriage is nothing
more than a voluntary association of two individuals, 38 a marriage, according to
both contemporary neo-natural lawyers and the canonical authorities on which they
rely, is a union of a man and woman for whom and between whom the spiritual and
biological unity achieved through “sex of the reproductive form” – by which is
meant heterosexual, noncontracepted, vaginal-penile, penetrative intercourse -both constitutes an act of spiritual friendship and an opening to the creation of life.

Casti Connubii, Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Christian Marriage to the Venerable
Brethren, Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other Local Ordinaries
Enjoying Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See, reconfirmed in Pope Pius
XII, Nature of Their Profession, Allocution to Midwives (1951), and in Encyclical
Letter Humanae Vitae of the Supreme Pontiff Paul VI to his Venerable Brethren,
Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other Local Ordinaries Enjoying
Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See , to the Clergy and Faithful of the
Whole Catholic World, and to All Men of Good Will, on the Regulation of Birth
(1968). See generally Gerald Kelly, S.J., Contraception and the Natural Law, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL
SOCIETY OF AMERICA CONTRACEPTION AND NATURAL LAW (1963). The author notes in this
paper that a considerable portion of that paper is taken from Contemporary Moral
Theology, II: Marriage Questions (Westminster, Newman Press 1963) by John C.
Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J.. For the modern arguments see Robert P. George &
Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 301-320
(1995); Christopher Tollefson, The New Natural Law Theory, 10 LYCEUM 1 (2008)
available at http://lyceumphilosophy.com/?q=node/97; Germain Grisez, Joseph
Boyle, John Finnis & William E. May, Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life:
Toward a Clearer Understanding, 52 THOMIST 365, 365-426 (1988).
38 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“Yet the marital couple is not an
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”).
37
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That form of sex – and only that form of sex – makes the husband and wife one flesh:
both biologically and spiritually whole. 39 Sex that is of this reproductive form – or
what they sometimes call “conjugal sex” -- is not simply a part of a healthy marriage,
it is its very moral point. It is what marriage is for: marriage is that relationship
within which heterosexual penetrative sex has this absolute moral value. It is that
sex, then – not affection, not simple friendship, not mutual care and regard, not joint
commitment to the welfare of each other, and not even the shared work of childraising -- which gives marriage its meaning and value likewise. Birth control not
only constitutes a form of endorsement of all the sex that is pursued for other ends,
but it also both represents and facilitates the marital participants’ willful splintering
of marital sex from its moral end or goal. It strips marital sex and therefore marriage
itself of its natural and moral purpose, which is the physical unity of marital
partners in a sexual act of spiritual friendship that is open to conception and the
eventual creation of new human life. When used by marital partners, birth control
is thus doubly wrongful. Outside of marriage, of course, it carries additional societal
harms and wrongs as well.
What has gone relatively unnoticed about this argument, perhaps by the
natural lawyers themselves but certainly by the natural lawyers’ legions of critics, is
that the natural lawyers’ brief against birth control, rests on not one, but two related
but nevertheless distinct claims about sexual morality. The first claim might be
called the “censorial claim”: all sexual relations that are not of the “reproductive
form” (marital, hetero, non-contracepted, vaginal-penile and penetrative), according
to the natural lawyers, are immoral. All such sex constitutes an instrumental use of
the body for other ends – whether that end be profit, exercise, pleasure, friendship,
or affection -- and thus an illicit splintering of the body and mind, or body and soul.
The censorial claim, in other words, asserts the necessary condition for moral sex:
for sex to be moral, it must be “of the reproductive form.” All sex that does not meet
that condition is immoral; contracepted sex inside or outside of marriage does not
meet those conditions, therefore, contracepted sex is immoral – and thus, the moral
wrongness of birth control.
The second claim, which is far less often examined and almost never
criticized, is what I will call the natural lawyers’ “valorizing claim”: all sex that is of
the reproductive form – sex that is hetero, vaginal-penile, penetrative, within
marriage and – most important here -- uncontracepted – is an unalloyed, natural,
human, spiritual and intrinsic good. This second claim asserts, in effect, that the
reproductive form is a sufficient condition for moral sex: all marital sex that is of the
reproductive form is a natural, human good. There are no further conditions to its
value. The use of birth control therefore frustrates participation in what would
otherwise be a morally praiseworthy, highly valorized, and intrinsically good act:
sex within marriage of the reproductive form (hereinafter, for short, “sex of the
marital form”, or sometimes, where the usage would not be ambiguous, “marital

Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84
GEO. L.J. 301, 301-320 (1995); Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis & William
E. May, Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life: Toward a Clearer
Understanding, 52 THOMIST 365, 365-426 (1988).
39
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sex.”). The natural lawyers’ brief against birth control then consists of two
arguments, and they are quite separate: first, contracepted sex even within
marriage, just like, and for the same reasons as, same sex-sex, fornication, adultery,
prostitution, and sex within marriage that is not of the reproductive form for some
other reason (non-penetrative, etc.), all of which they call alternately “recreational,”
“affective,” “instrumental,” or “pleasurable,” is wrong. This follows from the
censorial claim. But second, so long as it is marital, non-contracepted sex – sex that
is open to the possibility of pregnancy – is a fundamental, unassailable human good.
The use of birth control within marriage negates or frustrates participation in that
human good. The second is a claim not about what sex is immoral and wrong, but
rather, what sex is fundamentally and always – unconditionally – good: procreative
sexual intercourse of the reproductive form within marriage. The use of birth
control by married partners prevents what would otherwise be participation in this
natural human good.
The natural lawyer’s censorial claim – that only sex of the marital form is
moral, or that all sex that is not of this form is immoral – has, perhaps needless to
say, attracted a tidal wave of criticism by legal scholars as well as sexual ethicists, in
large part because of the major implications it seems to entail that pertain to law
(or, more accurately, its entailed implications that have in the recent past pertained
to law, given a pre-Lawrence conception of the scope of the police power), including,
but by no means limited to, its censorial stance toward birth control. 40 First, of
course, it immediately follows from the natural lawyers’ censorial claim that “samesex marriage” is oxymoronic and its provision by states ill-advised: civil marriage is
the legal institution the very point of which is to protect the social institution of
marriage, which in turn and by definition exists so as to facilitate heterosexual,
penetrative sex of the marital form, meaning that sex – penile-vaginal, penetrative
and procreative -- which in form leads to conception. 41 This is the argument that
has been most criticized by commentators and has been likewise rejected by almost
every court that has examined it, as well as by increasing numbers of state
legislatures: whatever might be true of the neo-natural lawyer’s understanding of
marriage, civil marriage, as defined and enforced by states, can serve a number of
purposes, including the provision of a legal form through which same sex or
opposite sex partners can publicly commit themselves to each others’ care, express
their love sexually and otherwise, conceive and raise children should they so desire,
and not at all least, provide a private “safety net” for the support of each other, thus
lessening the need of the state to do so. 42 Second, and as now countless
commentators have argued, it follows from the natural lawyer’s censorial claim that
See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J.
261 (1995); Chai Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and
More, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005).
41 See Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination,
84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995).
42 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baskin v. Bogan,
766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014);
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2014).
40
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non-marital sex in any form and toward any end, including all same-sex sex,
contracepted or non-contracepted heterosexual sex between unmarried persons, or
sex between partners of either or any gender that is motivated by a desire to cement
feelings of long-lasting and deep love, is illicit. 43 Only traditionally married
partners can engage in the sexual relations that are of the right, meaning “marital,”
form. Therefore, unmarried persons, including all gays and lesbians, should not
engage in sex at all. Unmarried straight people of course can aspire to marry and
enjoy a sexual life; gay people, though, should simply abstain. It thus denies the
morality not only of gay sex that is sought solely for pleasure, or money, or prestige,
but also of affective gay sex, meaning sex between same-sex partners who are
committed to each other and to a long term or life-long relationship, who may wish
to civilly marry in those states that allow it, and who may wish to have and raise
children. If correct, this would suggest either a reason to criminalize both gay sex
and fornication, or at least a reason not to encourage it through opening up the
marital franchise. 44 A number of commentators, including most prominently
Steven Macedo and Chai Feldblum, have argued that proponents of the censorial
claim simply fail to see the moral value of affective sex, and particularly of gay
affective sex. 45 (For that reason, Macedo provocatively called this prong of the
natural lawyer’s argument a “failure of the conservative imagination;” 46 Feldblum
for similar reasons titled the article in which she argues against the censorial prong
of the natural lawyer’s understanding, “Gay is Good,” 47 by which she meant, gay sex
is a positive moral good, and not just an activity protected by privacy rights.)
Third, it follows from the natural lawyers’ censorial claim that not only
should only married heterosexual partners engage in sex, but married partners
should engage in only that form of sex. Sex “of the right form” within marriage is a
sacred comingling of the marital participants in a form of sexual intercourse that has
a particular teleological purpose, to wit, conception. All other sex, including sex
inside of marriage that is either contracepted or that is otherwise not of the right
form (meaning, non penile-vaginal or non-penetrative), interrupts the moral link
between marital sex and conception, thus stripping sex of any moral or religious
purpose. It reduces it to an instrumental use of the body for nothing but base
pleasure. This prong of the argument has of course also been subjected to criticism,

Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261
(1995).
44 Finnis argues for the latter, viewing the criminalization of gay sex unwise and
unjust for traditionally liberal reasons.
45 STEPHEN MACEDO, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 2XX
(1995); STEPHEN MACEDO, Against the Old Sexual Morality of the New Natural Law, in
NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY (Robert P. George, ed., Clarendon Press,
1996); Chai Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More,
17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005).
46 Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 2XX
(1995).
47 Chai Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More, 17
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005)..
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including by both birth control advocates and sexual libertarians, from the nineteen
twenties through the 1970s. 48 In short, to sum the criticism, the natural lawyers’
censorial condemnation of contracepted and non-vaginally-penetrative marital sex,
as well as all extramarital and same-sex sex, rests on a view of sexuality, pleasure
and love that seems untrue to the experience of vast numbers of married as well as
unmarried people. For many married and unmarried partners alike in long term
committed relationships, contracepted or non-penetrative sex is both moral and of
great value: its value and its morality both lie in the pleasure it facilitates and the
way in which it cements the partners’ affection for each other. The same seems true,
furthermore, for many people, in same sex and opposite sex relations of shorter
duration, and again regardless of the type of sex in which the partners are engaged.
Common to almost all of the contemporary criticisms from political theorists
and legal scholars that have been widely aired of the canonical and neo-natural
lawyers’ conception of heterosexual morality, however, has been the critics’ focus
on the Church’s censorial claim. That is, the natural lawyers’ secular critics have
focused almost entirely on all of the sex that the natural lawyers morally condemn:
sex-for-pleasure of all forms in or outside of marriage, expressive sex within or
outside marriage, opposite as well as same-sex sex outside of traditional marriage
that expresses and enhances love in long lasting and committed relationships, and,
of course, contracepted sex inside traditional marriage, the point of which is not
only to give and receive pleasure but also to cement love and affection. What has
been roundly criticized by the natural lawyers’ legal critics, in other words, with
only a few exceptions, is the neo-natural lawyer’s censorial claim that the “marital
form” is a necessary condition of the morality of sexual activity, and that all sexual
activity that doesn’t meet that condition is immoral. What has gone almost entirely
un-criticized, by contrast, and indeed almost unnoted, is what I’ve called above the
natural lawyer’s “valorizing claim”: the claim that all marital sex of the marital form
–uncontracepted, vaginal-penile, penetrative sex in marriage – is an intrinsic human
and common good, or more briefly, that the marital form (which again includes the
requirement that the sex be un-contracepted) is a sufficient condition for the
goodness of sex. Critics have focused, almost entirely, on the sex that the natural
lawyers are against (which includes contracepted sex) and criticized them for that
reason. By contrast, the critics have focused almost not at all on the sex that the
natural lawyers are so fervently for: sex “of the marital form” within marriages, and
For early twentieth century arguments focused on feminist campaigns against
involuntary motherhood and the institutions of marriage and the Church, see The
Public Writings and Speeches of Margaret Sanger, available at http://www.nyu.ed
u/projects/sanger/webedition/app/documents/show.php?sangerDoc=128167.xml
; Margaret Sanger, No God, No Masters, in THE WOMAN REBEL, March 1914, 1, 8, 16, at
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5084/. For late twentieth century arguments focused
on sexual liberty, see, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, RESISTING INJUSTICE AND THE ETHICS OF
CARE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA: “SUDDENLY… ALL THE TRUTH WAS COMING OUT” (Routledge,
2013); Carol Gilligan and DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE DEEPENING DARKNESS: PATRIARCHY,
RESISTANCE, AND DEMOCRACY'S FUTURE (Cambridge University Press, 2009); David A.J.
Richards, Women, Gays and the Constitution (University of Chicago Press, 1998).
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the pregnancies to which they lead. Those sexual acts, and those pregnancies,
again, for neo-natural lawyers, are the moral point of marriage itself. All sex “of the
marital form” – all hetero, penetrative, vaginal-penile, uncontracepted sex within
marriage -- is morally salutary. Such sex is an intrinsic human and common good.
This second, and much less examined valorizing natural law claim regarding
the absolute goodness of marital sex, rather than the badness of non-marital, is at
least as equally significant a part of the natural lawyers’ brief against birth control -although it doesn’t figure so centrally in their argument against homosexuality,
which may be why it has gone relatively uncriticized. Thus, the natural lawyer’s
argument against birth control does not rest solely on the censorial claim that
contracepted sex, as well as all other non-marital sex, is bad. It is a gross
misunderstanding – and a serious diminution -- of the natural law view of human
sexuality and of sexual morality to limit it to its censorial claim condemning the sex
they view as immoral. Rather, the natural law view of sexuality, in its totality, also
rests on the profoundly valorizing and radically pro-sex claim that all noncontracepted sex of the marital form, (including such sex between infertile couples,
where the infertility is for natural reasons) and all the pregnancies to which that sex
often leads, are all very, very good. Indeed, the wrongness of birth control used
within marriage (as contrasted to outside marriage) is precisely that it interrupts
that form of morally praiseworthy sex by intentionally and artificially frustrating the
possibility of conception. The wrongness of birth control, in other words, is not only
that it facilitates immoral sex, but also that it frustrates otherwise morally
exemplary procreative sex -- which is the raison d’etre, and the very center of
married life. It is this valorizing pro-sex claim of the natural lawyers, as well as the
argument against birth control which it grounds, that has gone virtually unnoticed
by the natural lawyers’ contemporary critics.
As a consequence, in part, of the natural lawyers’ critics’ relative inattention
to it, not only the natural lawyer’s valorizing claim itself – that uncontracepted
marital sex is an intrinsic human good – but also the harms -- particularly for
married women -- that claim might engender when it grounds married life, have
gone relatively unnoticed in the scholarly literature, although not, one might
surmise, in married life itself. Critics have focused on and catalogued instead the
harms caused by the censorial claim: the denial of the equal value and worth of
same-sex affective sex, the unnecessary censure of sexual expression, the dour and
damning stance toward sexual pleasure both within and outside marriage, the
sizeable social costs of criminalizing or censuring prostitution, fornication, or
homosexuality, and of course the condemnatory stance toward same-sex couples
and same-sex marriage, with the consequent inequalities and heartache that
condemnation visits upon a sizeable portion of the population. Critics have not
looked at the harms that might be caused by the natural lawyers’ valorizing pro-sex
claim: that all uncontracepted sex within marriage that is of the marital form is an
intrinsic human good. The legalistic black box created by RFRA, Hobby Lobby, and
the debate surrounding that case, as described above, pushes those arguments, and
the harms they might cause, all the further from public awareness. Those harms,
though, are quite real, and they are utterly distinct, and quite different, from the
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harms caused by the censorship of pleasurable and affective sex. The next section
tries at least to catalogue them.
b. Is Procreative Marital Sex an Intrinsic Good? One Critique

What does the neo-lawyers’ blanket moral celebration of all uncontracepted
marital sex include? What falls within the category of the sex the natural lawyers
approve, applaud, and celebrate, and might some of that laudatory celebration be
misguided?
Does it include, for example, nonconsensual marital sex? Does the “sex of the
reproductive form,” that, according to the natural lawyers is an intrinsic and natural
human good, include rape? It isn’t at all clear. 49 In their many elaborate definitions
and descriptions of marital sex, and their constant iteration of the various
conditions that sex must meet, in order for it to be moral and praiseworthy, “mutual
consent” of the parties is never, that I can find, unambiguously included. Its enough,
rather, that sex be marital: consent doesn’t enter the picture. Thus, Thomas
Aquinas believed that married women have a positive duty to be sexually available
to their husbands, and to deny their husbands sexual access was sinful (and vice
versa; men likewise have a duty to be sexually available to their wives). A woman
who withholds sex from her husband, he believed, commits a greater sin than a
man’s rape of a stranger – the former is a sin against nature, while the latter is
simply a sin against a person. 50 A “marital rape,” therefore, is the result of a
woman’s sin of withholding, not a man’s sin of imposing. The Encyclical from 1930
that explains the Church’s view of marriage, marital sex, and family life, doesn’t
noticeably soften this Thomistic stance. In the only reference I could find to even
the topic of consent, Pope Pius explains that periodic abstinence is an acceptable
method of birth control, but only if both partners consent to it. Thus, presumably,

As a legal matter, consent was not a condition of legal marital sex until the
reforms of the 1980s began to result in the systematic removal, or at least trimming
back, of marital rape exemptions in states’ regulation of rape. As Jill Hasday has
shown in her seminal history of the period, nineteenth century feminists advocated
against forced sex in marriage, albeit on varying grounds: forced sex in marriage
leads to “excessive maternity,” which in turn leaves women incapable of living out
full adult lives, and incapable of adequately mothering the children they already
have; it deprives married women of control of their own bodies, thus depriving
them of physical integrity; it renders them incapable of exercising the autonomy
necessary for civic life, and it subjects them to a host of physical harms and
attendant health problems. None of these arguments got much traction, either in
the time they were made nor in the century that followed. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest
and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000).
50 I thank Mary Becker for the point. For a full discussion, see Mary Becker, David C.
Baum Memorial Lectures on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights at the University of
Illinois College of Law, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex
Marriage: Two are Better than One, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1 (April 15, 1999).
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the desire of only one party that the couple abstain from sex (in order to prevent
conception) is not a sufficient grounds for abstaining: if one party wishes to abstain
but the other party does not, the sex not only may happen but apparently should. 51
To translate this into modern terms, a woman’s “no,” according to Pope Pius writing
in the 1930s, may indeed mean no, but that “no” is not by itself a sufficient reason to
abstain from marital intercourse if her husband does not agree; the man has veto
power. By the sixties, this position had apparently softened, albeit only somewhat:
in the 1968 Encyclical on birth control, Pope Paul references and apparently with
some approval his understanding that “men have rightly thought” that for a man to
impose sex on one’s partner “against her reasonable wishes” (my emphasis) is a
wrong – although this observation about what “men have rightly thought” is made
only to suggest that anyone who so thinks, should also see the immorality of having
sex against the reasonable wishes of the Divine Creator – meaning, should also see
the immorality of contracepted sex. 52 One wonders, though, what might be the
status of a sexual act imposed against a wife’s unreasonable wishes. Nevertheless, at
least by the sixties, a married woman’s no, within canonical catholic thinking on the
topic, apparently means no and must be abided, so long as the “no” rests on
reasonable grounds, or at least, according to the Pope, so some men rightly think.
It is still, today, not entirely clear whether the “marital form” that sex must
be, in order for it to be morally exemplary, includes a requirement that it be
consensual. Thus its worth noting that in the quite detailed contemporary scholarly
discussions of the multiple necessary conditions for moral sex penned by
contemporary natural lawyers – that it be between married partners, that it be noncontracepted, that it be penetrative and penile-vaginal rather than oral or anal or
digital, and so on – there is never, that I have found, even a mention of the idea that
it must also be consensual. There is no mention, for example, in Bradley and
George’s lengthy article from the mid-1990s in the Georgetown Law Journal detailing
the nature of marital sex, that consent is a necessary condition for moral
heterosexual relations. 53 Of course, that may well be because Bradley, George and
other contemporary neo-natural lawyers now regard the necessity of consent as so
apparent as to require no mention. But it’s an odd and disconcerting omission
nevertheless.
What, though, of unwanted marital sex? By that phrase, just to be clear, I do
not mean rape, but rather, that marital sex to which a woman or a man
unambiguously consents, but which she or he does not physically desire, and do not
emotionally welcome or want. Does “sex of the marital form” that the natural
lawyers laud include that sex – sex in which women engage, and to which they
unambiguously consent, but which they do not physically or emotionally desire? Is
unwanted sex included, within the natural lawyers’ blanket valorization of marital
sex? Given the insistent and now millennia-long valorization within Catholic
theological thought of sex of the marital form itself – hetero, non-contracepted,
1930 Encyclical at paragraph 53.
Faithfulness to God’s Design, Paragraph 13, 1968 Encyclical.
53 Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84
GEO. L.J. 301 (1995).
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vaginal-penile and penetrative – its not unreasonable to surmise that an awful lot of
that sex is indeed physically unpleasurable for women, simply because the type of
sex endorsed has virtually nothing to do with the physical location of the sources of
women’s sexual pleasure. For that reason alone, it seems fair to speculate that much
of the sex that the natural lawyers laud is also not physically desired, and, perhaps,
therefore not wanted or emotionally welcomed, by some, and maybe many wives.
It might be fair to surmise, then, although there’s remarkably little scholarship on
the point, 54 that women in traditional marriages engage in at least some marital sex
(sex of the marital form) that they do not physically desire or find particularly
pleasurable. If so, they are engaging in an act – unwanted, undesired, and
unwelcome but nevertheless consensual sex – that is, according to a wave or recent
social science research, apparently relatively common among heterosexual women,
and, at least in some age groups among heterosexual men as well, and one that is

There is a growing body of social sciences scholarship on unwanted sex engaged in by
college students and young adults of both sexes, some of it inspired by and informed by
feminist concerns that the willingness of young women to consent to sex they do not
want is a function of gender role stereotyping. Alyson K. Spurgas, Embodied Invisible
W om en’
s R oles in
Labor and Sexual Carework:
Intimate Relationships, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Emily A. Impett
& Letitia A. Peplau, Why Some Women Consent to Sex with a Dating Partner: Insights
from Attachment Theory, 26 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN QUARTERLY 360-370 (2002);
Shantee Foster, Consensual Unwanted Sex: Motivations and Reservations (May 1, 2011)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro); Sarah
J. Walker, When “no” becomes “yes”: Why girls and women consent to unwanted sex, 6
APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOLOGY 157-166 (1997); Susan Sprecher et al., Token
Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent to Unwanted Sexual Intercourse: College
Students’ Dating Experience in Three Countries, 31 THE JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH
125-132 (1994); Lucia F. O’Sullivan & Elizabeth R. Allgeier, Feigning sexual desire:
Consenting to unwanted sexual activity in heterosexual dating relationships, 35 THE
JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH 234-243 (1998); Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Stephen W.
Cook, Men’s self-reports of unwanted sexual activity 24 THE JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH
58-72 (1988); Miriam Lewin, Unwanted Intercourse: The Difficulty of Saying No, 9
PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN QUARTERLY 184-192 (1995); Pamela I. Erickson, Andrea J.
Rapkin, Unwanted sexual experiences among middle and high school youth, 12 JOURNAL
OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 319-325 (1991); Amy Buddie et al., Consenting to unwanted
sex: Effects of gender and relationship type, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the Southeastern Psychological Association (2011); There is only one article that I have
found on the propensity of married women to consent to sex they don’t want, and that
involves young married brides in India. K.G. Santhya, Nicole Haberland, F. Ram, R.K.
Sinha ad S.K. Mohanty, Consent and Coercion: Examining Unwanted Sex Among
Married Young Women in India, Vol. 33 INTERNATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES 124 (2007).
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increasingly recognized in that literature as carrying with it distinctive, serious and
long lasting harms. 55
Short of physical coercion, why might women, including married women and
including married women in traditional marriages, engage in unwanted sex? And
what might the natural lawyers say of that sex, or those reasons for engaging in it? I
will discuss the general phenomenon in some detail below (and have addressed it in
greater detail elsewhere), here I will focus quickly on what might be married
women’s distinctive reasons for doing so. Presumably, women who have marital
sex that they do not physically desire might do so for a host of reasons, at least some
of which our two most prominent neo-natural lawyers – George Bradley and Robert
George -- would (if I may speculate, they don’t discuss this) criticize as
“instrumental”: a married woman might engage in unwanted marital sex to retain
her husband’s affection, loyalty, fidelity, or support, to maintain relative domestic
peace in the household, as a quid pro quo for his day to day financial support for
herself and her children, to avoid her husband’s foul mood, wrath, anger, or
violence, out of altruism, pity, or friendship, or simply because she feels it is
expected of her by their social or religious community. Again, I think its clear that
Bradley and George would find most of these “instrumental” uses of the sexual body
to achieve other ends worrisome, and I think they would be right to do so. In a
similar vein, and in an arguably prescient passage, Pope Pius argued that the use of
birth control within marriage might encourage in men a tendency to view their
wives and their wives’ bodies as a vehicle for the satisfaction of their own physical
desires, rather than with the reverence that God and the Church demand and which
their wives deserve. 56 This is at least an indirect but notably feminist condemnation
of not only a husband’s exploitation of his wife’s body but also and more generally, a
critique of unwanted marital sex, although couched within an argument against
birth control and sex engaged in for pleasure, not in an argument focused on harms
to the woman whose body may come to be so regarded. Nevertheless, the common
ground is notable and important. Although they don’t focus on it, both Bradley and
George in the nineteen nineties, and Pope Pius in the nineteen thirties, lay the
groundwork for clear arguments against instrumental and unwanted sex rooted in
natural law thinking itself: they are opposed to instrumental sex, and much of the
unwanted sex within marriage is instrumentally motivated, virtually by definition. I
will return to this important point in my conclusions.
Bradley and George’s reason for finding instrumental, unwanted, marital sex
to be worrisome, however, like the Pope’s earlier statement regarding the damage
THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 243 (Franklin Miller & Alan
Wertheimer, eds., 2009); Robin West, The Harms of Consensual Sex, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SEX: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 317 (Alan Soble & Nicholas Power, eds., 5th ed.)
(2008).
55

Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii, Encyclical on Christian Marriage (1930), reconfirmed
in Pope Pius XII, Nature of Their Profession, Allocution to Midwives (1951), and in
Supreme Pontiff Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Birth
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that might be done by men’s unleashed desires, is clearly its instrumentality, and
not its “unwanted-ness.” That is, neo-natural lawyers might well object to
unwanted marital sex engaged in for the purpose of securing domestic peace, or for
financial support, or to meet community expectations, or to satiate a husband’s
physical sexual needs – I think they would so object – but they would object to all
that unwanted marital sex (assuming they would) for precisely the same reason that
they object to contracepted sex-for-pleasure or sex-for-money or sex-for-love: all of
that sex – the sex for pleasure as well as sex for other ends -- is the instrumental use
of the sexual body for ends other than what gives sex its moral meaning: the
conjugal union of a man and a woman in a sexual act of the reproductive form.
There is, in other words, at least in Bradley and George’s account, a blanket
condemnation of “instrumental” sex, and presumably that would include unwanted
instrumental sex as well. What there isn’t, though, in Bradley and George’s account,
nor in any of the Encyclicals (that I can find), is a blanket condemnation, or really
any criticism at all, of unwanted sex “of the marital form” whether instrumental or
not. And of course there is no discussion or recognition of the harms that unwanted
sex might cause.
In fact, in a striking passage, Bradley and George argue very much to the
contrary – that unpleasurable sex that is not instrumental, is not, therefore, wrong,
and might even be morally required. Even infertile married couples who can’t
procreate and don’t get any pleasure from sex nevertheless have a “reason” –
meaning, a moral reason, rather than an instrumental reason, and thus, presumably,
a duty – to engage in marital sex, regardless of both their infertility and their mutual
lack of desire. Note, such a couple has no instrumental reason – either to procreate
or for pleasure – to have sex at all. Nevertheless, Bradley and George suggest, they
should have marital sex. Thus, at least un-pleasurable sex of the marital form,
unlike unwanted sex engaged in for the instrumental reasons described above, is
not only morally permissible, it may also be morally required. 57 Now, presumably -although they don’t say so -- if a couple has a moral reason to engage in sex that
neither finds pleasurable and that presumably neither wishes to have, then they
likewise have a moral reason to engage in sex that is desired and enjoyed by one
party, but not the other. Given the necessity of a man’s erection to penetrative
vaginal-penile sex, the necessity of some form of desire to an erection, and the nonvaginal nature of female pleasure and orgasm (obviously all well known facts by the
mid-1990s) a lack of desire for sex “of the marital form” by the woman, but not the
man, is a far more likely scenario, than the jointly undesired sex Bradley and George
describe, and prescribe. What Bradley and George implicitly argue, in other words,
is that a couple has a moral duty to engage in even unwanted sex so long as it is noninstrumental, which sex of the marital form, definitionally, is not. While they don’t
say so explicitly, what this seems to suggest is that a wife has a moral duty to engage
in sex which her husband may very much desire but which she does not desire, and
which he might enjoy but from which she receives no pleasure.
Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84
GEO. L.J. 301, 305-306 (1995).
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Does all of this unwanted sex cause harm? I have argued elsewhere, as have
a handful of feminist legal theorists and more recently a number of social scientists
as well, that unwanted sex – sex to which women consent but which they do not
desire – carries with it a host of possible psychic and emotional and political harms.
I will elaborate on those harms in the next section, and will suggest some reasons to
worry that women in long term relationships, including marriage, that engage in
such sex, may suffer more of those harms than women in short term relationships. I
will defer a recitation of those harms to the next section below, where I will discuss
the harms of unwanted consensual sex both inside and outside of marriage. My
point here is narrower: the natural lawyers’ valorization of marital sex, on which
their condemnation of birth control rests, seemingly endorses as morally salutary,
and perhaps even morally obligatory, precisely this unwanted sex, so long as it is of
the marital form. Again, that unwanted sex might be injurious – I will argue below
that it is – and if so, then it might well be all the more injurious when inside long
term relationships, such as traditional marriage, than outside it. Here. I just want to
make clear that the natural lawyer’s conception of heterosexual morality is not just
inattentive to those possible harms. It seemingly celebrates the sex that causes
them.
There is, though, a third and much less contestable harm that is quite clearly
occasioned by “sex of the marital form,” that I will elaborate here, and that is – oddly
-- almost entirely untouched by the neo-natural lawyers’ contemporary critics. The
natural lawyer’s valorization of procreative marital sex includes all marital sex, not
only whether or not it’s wanted and perhaps whether or not its consensual, but also,
and unambiguously, whether or not it leads to unwanted pregnancies. Marital sex,
recall, at least for the modern popes, might be permissibly regulated through
natural forms of birth control – meaning rhythm methods – but it must also always
be open to at least the possibility of conception. That is, after all, its moral and
natural point. Some of that sex will obviously be open to conception not only in
form, but also in fact: thus, much of the procreative marital sex the natural lawyers
celebrate will result in pregnancies and live births. And, some of those pregnancies
– some sizeable subset of all the pregnancies that result from the marital sex that is
valorized by natural lawyers – meaning, again, sex that is coital, procreative, and
within marriage –might not be in the woman or her husband or her other children’s
best interests, all things considered. Some of those pregnancies (whether or not
wanted), might be a burden to the woman’s health or wellbeing, or to her education,
her employment, or her employment prospects, or to the couple’s pocketbook.
Those pregnancies might be objectively harmful, or at least costly, for any of those
reasons. In addition, though, many of the pregnancies caused by marital sex,
whether or not wise, are clearly not wanted, or desired, by the women who will bear
them – as evidenced, in part, by the abortion rate for women in traditional as well as
non-traditional marriages or relationships. 58 Yet, according to the neo-natural
See Guttmacher Inst., Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancies in the United States
(Feb. 2015), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-UnintendedPregnancy-US.html (stating that incidence of unintended pregnancies is twice as
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lawyers, all marital sex, not only those sexual acts which lead to wanted
pregnancies, but also those which lead to unwanted pregnancies, constitute an
unassailable, natural, human good. A wife’s desire for sex is generally not a
condition for the morality of the sex that follows, as we’ve seen, but a desire to be
pregnant is likewise not a condition either for the morality of the procreative sex
itself, or for the morality of the pregnancy that follows the sex. A lack of desire to be
pregnant may justify a decision of the couple to abstain from sex, if both partners
consent to the abstention. For the modern popes, even a unilateral desire of the
woman’s to abstain from sex might be a sufficient reason to abstain, if the desire is
“reasonable,” and a desire to not be pregnant might presumably sometimes qualify
as reasonable. But an unwanted pregnancy does not detract from the morally
salutary nature of the sex, or from the morally salutary nature of the pregnancy,
should she become pregnant in spite of her efforts not to. And of course it never
justifies the use of artificial – and therefore effective -- birth control.
In contrast to the popes’ and the neo-natural lawyers possibly shifting
position on the morality of nonconsensual or unwanted marital sex, their position
on this point is absolutely unambiguous and distressingly unchanging. The 1930,
the 1951, and the 1968 Encyclicals are all quite clear on this point, as are the neonatural lawyers’ more contemporary elucidation of the position from the 1990s and
2000s. 59 In fact, both the Popes and the scholars emphatically insist on it. A
pregnancy that is unwanted nevertheless ushers in a new life that must be
welcomed, nurtured and celebrated. The pregnancy as well, then, must be
welcomed, nurtured and celebrated, regardless of desire that runs to the contrary,
regardless of whether that pregnancy endangers the woman or even puts her life at
risk. So, then, must be the sex that caused it. Again, just to review the qualifications
of this: recall the 1930 encyclical, which states that a couple may practice abstinence
during the period in which they believe a woman is fertile (meaning, they may
employ the natural rhythm method) and that they may do so for the purpose of
avoiding conception. They may do so, however, only if both parties “consent” to this.
It follows from the proviso – that they may abstain only if both parties consent to
the abstention – that a wife’s unilateral desire to abstain from procreative sex –her
lack of desire for or even her lack of consent to procreative sex – is not sufficient
grounds for abstaining: no to procreative sex might mean no, but it doesn’t mean no
high for women outside of marriage as inside, but rate of unintended pregnancies
within marriage is still quite high: 20 out of 1,000 women).
See generally Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Shifts in intended and unintended
pregnancies in the United States, 2001–2008, 104 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
HEALTH 43 (Supp. 2014).
59 Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii, Encyclical on Christian Marriage (1930), reconfirmed
in Pope Pius XII, Nature of Their Profession, Allocution to Midwives (1951), and in
Supreme Pontiff Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Birth
(1968); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination,
84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995); Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis & William E. May,
Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life: Toward a Clearer Understanding, 52
THOMIST 365 (1988)
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sex, unless both parties agree to the no. Her husband has a veto over her
abstention. In the 1968 Encyclical, the Pope indirectly endorses what he
characterizes as a view held by “many men,” that a man should not impose sex upon
his wife against her “reasonable wishes” – but it isn’t at all clear whether a wish not
to become pregnant is always a reasonable wish, if he does not share it. These
qualifications, however, of the duty to have marital sex pertain only to the rhythm
method. Both Popes are quite clear that a desire to not become pregnant, even if
both parties share it and even if it is entirely “reasonable,” and even if it is therefore
sufficient to justify abstention, is not a sufficient warrant for the use of artificial
birth control that will actually prove effective. To put this all together, a married
woman, according to both Popes who have spoken in detail on the subject, has a
moral obligation to have procreative marital sex she does not desire and from which
she receives no pleasure, and then a further obligation to bear a pregnancy she does
not desire, and which may threaten her life, her health, her pocketbook, or her
family’s overall wellbeing. Because they do not address it, it is not at all clear
whether contemporary natural law scholars, including Finnis, Bradley and George,
would disagree.
What harms attend to all of those unwanted pregnancies? All pregnancies of
course, certainly including intensely wanted ones, carry risks and costs, both to a
woman’s health and to her mobility and employment. 60 Unwanted pregnancies,
however, carry far more. Some of these risks and costs are well known. First, a lack
of desire to be pregnant is surely oftentimes a sensible proxy for greater harms
down the road: If a woman did not want the pregnancy because of health risks,
those risks are obviously more likely to come to pass – unwanted pregnancies will
tend to correlate with those pregnancies that are more health endangering and life
threatening than intended and wanted pregnancies. 61 Likewise, if she did not want
the pregnancy because of worries about employment, then it is more likely than if
the pregnancy were wanted, that the pregnancy may well cause an interruption in
her work. 62 If she did not want the pregnancy because she has too many children to

Eileen McDonagh, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647
(2011).
61 See Guttmacher Inst., Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancies in the United States
(Feb. 2015), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-UnintendedPregnancy-US.html noting that births resulting from unintended or closely spaced
pregnancies are associated with adverse maternal and child health outcomes, such
as delayed prenatal care, premature birth and negative physical and mental health
effects for children.
62Id. The costs associated with unintended pregnancy would be even higher if not for
continued federal and state investments in family planning services. In 2010, the
nationwide public investment in family planning services resulted in $13.6 billion in net
savings from helping women avoid unintended pregnancies and a range of other negative
reproductive health outcomes, such as HIV and other STIs, cervical cancer and infertility.
In the absence of the current U.S. publicly funded family planning effort, the public costs
of unintended pregnancies in 2010 might have been 75% higher. Total public
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care for already, then again, it is likely that she was right to so worry: her mothering
and her existing children may suffer. So will her engagement in educational, social,
civic and cultural life. A lack of desire to be pregnant, in other words, is clearly a
proxy for the familiar objective harms of pregnancy. And of course, a married
woman’s lack of desire for a pregnancy means that it may lead either to an abortion,
in spite of whatever strong moral objections she may harbor to the procedure, or to
an unwanted birth. Either outcome is harmful and in well documented ways. 63 A
woman’s lack of desire for a pregnancy, in other words, is a pretty good indicator
that the pregnancy may be against her or her family’s interest.
But an unwanted pregnancy might also carry less sizeable but less noted
risks of psychic, emotional and political harms – harms which are independent of or
in addition to the increased risks of whatever factors might have rendered the
pregnancy unwanted. This hasn’t been much studied, at least empirically: although
there is a sizeable literature on the poor outcomes for the children who are
produced from unwanted pregnancies, and a wealth of literature on both the
financial costs and the risks to mental and physical health of unwanted pregnancies,
there is surprisingly little reported empirical scholarship on the psychic, as opposed
to physical or economic harms of unwanted pregnancy. There is though a wealth of
anecdotal and autobiographical accounts, as well as some excellent philosophical
accounts, of the nature and experience of unwanted pregnancy, 64 and from that
base, some inferences seem fairly warranted regarding the psychic harms those
pregnancies engender. Of course, an undesired pregnancy is obviously less joyful
than a wanted pregnancy, and without that joy, the discomfort and sickness
attendant to even much wanted pregnancies are significant psychic as well as
physical harms. But there are other harms as well, less noticed, but equally
important, that attach to an unwanted pregnancy, even if that pregnancy is
medically unexceptional, and whether or not it leads to a live birth, miscarriage or
abortion. I believe there are four, which I will first just list, and then comment on
their significance.
First, and with or without morning sickness, and as Professor Eileen
McDonough has carefully shown in her highly original and groundbreaking midnineties political and theoretical defense of abortion, titled Breaking the Abortion
Deadlock, an unwanted pregnancy is felt by many woman to be an unwanted and
expenditures on unintended pregnancies nationwide were estimated to be $21.0 billion in
2010. Of that, $14.6 billion were federal expenditures and $6.4 billion were state
expenditures.
63 Guttmacher, supra note 61. There are no uncontested long lasting harms of legal
and safe abortions, but with the increasing number of legal restrictions on the
availability of abortion, it is no longer safe to assume that abortions are either legal
or safe.
64 See, e.g., Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. 490 (No. 66-605) (hereinafter, “Voices Brief”); Eileen McDonagh, BREAKING THE
ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT, (Oxford University Press, 1996); Shari
Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011).
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therefore assaultive intrusion into the body by the developing body, the interests,
and the needs, of another human life. 65 An unwanted pregnancy, she argues, is
often, and perhaps always, experienced by the woman who bears it as an assaultive
invasion, and compromise, of her physical integrity: the attached fetus compromises
the boundaries of her body as demarcating her separateness from others. 66 If she is
right about that, and I think she is, one harm of an unwanted pregnancy is simply
the compromise of a woman’s bodily integrity. Second, and as a number of
philosophers have argued in the different context of abortion rights, and somewhat
analogously to the effect of a military draft on men’s bodies, an unwanted pregnancy
undermines a woman’s self-sovereignty. It reorients the purpose of her body, both in
her own perception, and that of others: her body is no longer a vehicle for the
sustenance and nurturance of the woman’s self. Her own body is no longer serving
the very particular end of nurturing or sustaining her own soul, or her own mind, or
her own mental and physical health, or her own activities, or her own raison d’etre,
or her own passions, or her own mission, or her own self-perceived point of being in
the world. Her body becomes the vehicle for the sustenance, nurturance, and
facilitation of somebody else. 67 So, this is the second harm: what I will call a
compromise of self-sovereignty. Third, and as a number of legal scholars as well as
philosophers have argued, an unwanted pregnancy robs the pregnant woman of
some measure of autonomy – it limits her freedom of movement and her range of
choices and options, sometimes quite severely, which, again, is obviously a harm. 68
And lastly, an unwanted pregnancy is quite literally alienating, in a traditionally
Marxist or labor-oriented sense: an unwanted pregnancy carried to term dictates
not only what a woman’s body is for (thus compromising self sovereignty), and
what she can do with it (thus limiting her autonomy) but also to what end her future
labor will be dedicated. 69 Her future labor (including both the labor of the birth
itself and her future maternity) as well as her present body must be dedicated, not
Eileen McDonagh, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 90-91,
(Oxford University Press, 1996); Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647
(2011).
66 McDonaugh, at 47.
67 This is portrayed vividly in Judith Thompson’s famous metaphor for an unwanted
and nonconsensual pregnancy, of a woman being forcible tied to a born person, who
will perish without the woman’s relinquishment of the use of her body for the
purpose of his sustenance. Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, J. PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 1 (1971).
68 Voices Brief, supra note 64; Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917 (2012).
69 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Andrew
Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1917 (2012); Susan Okin, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 83 (Basic Books, 1989);
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH L. REV. 1569 (1979); Judith Jarvis
Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1 (1971).
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to her own ends, but to the health of the fetus and then the well-being of the child. 70
The relatively unstudied psychic (and political) harms of unwanted pregnancy, then,
entirely aside from the familiar litany of financial and physical costs, are at least
fourfold: an unwanted pregnancy compromises a woman’s physical integrity and
her self sovereignty, and it limits her autonomy and her destiny in ways which ought
to be easily recognized, at least by legal and labor scholars, as peculiarly but
profoundly alienating.
Of course, a fully wanted pregnancy also compromises a woman’s physical
integrity and self sovereignty, and limits her autonomy and destiny – limits the
profundity of which often come as a bit of a shock, even to women who fervently
desire their pregnancies. But where a pregnancy is wanted those limits can be fairly
characterized – and are often experienced -- as a longed-for communion, mingling,
or expansion of a woman’s own egoistic ends so as to include those of another
human life. A wanted pregnancy is a complex and extended and quite profound
physical act of sharing, and might well be emotionally and spiritually uplifting for
that very reason, despite the attendant risks and harms. A wanted pregnancy is, in
effect, a desired -- sometimes intensely desired -- departure from the atomizing and
hyper-individuating norm of liberal selfhood. 71 As such, I have argued elsewhere as
have a number of others that the experience of wanted pregnancy constitutes a
significant counter-example, both in theory and in life, to the valorization of
atomistic individualism so central to liberal theory and to economic life in liberal
market economies. 72 An unwanted pregnancy, however, and by contrast,
compromises the pregnant woman’s physical integrity, her self-sovereignty, her
autonomy, and her destiny, and does so in ways that are essentially assaultive
rather than communal, and in ways that are anything but morally enriching. The
fetus takes from, rather than shares with the woman. Her will and her heart are not
in it. Both the fetus and the potential child enslave and threaten rather than enrich
her future. An unwanted pregnancy, in other words, exploitatively, rather than
communally, defines a woman’s body and her future labor as existing for the sake of
another, rather than for her self. Whether a pregnancy constitutes a profound and
poignant counter to liberal individualism, or an injury that liberalism ought to
cleanly recognize as harmful precisely because of its forced illiberalism, is entirely a
function of whether or not it is wanted. Liberals ought to be interested in the
project of understanding the psychic harms of unwanted pregnancy for that reason
alone.
For a number of reasons already noted, the financial, physical, mental and
particularly the psychic (and political) harms to women that are consequent to
unwanted pregnancies, and that are themselves the natural and fully foreseeable
This is the focus of the justly famous article by Andrew Koppelman on unwanted
pregnancy as slavery; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
737 (1989).
71 ROBIN WEST, Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts, in A NATION OF
WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen
Katz eds., University of Michigan Press 2014).
72 Id.
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consequence of uncontracepted sex, both marital and non, have not been made
particularly visible in the most recent wave of legal and political commentary
triggered by struggles over the birth control mandate in the Affordable Care Act,
culminating in the Hobby Lobby decision itself. Again, this is at least in part because
of the legal construction of the issues, as discussed above: Hobby Lobby in particular
marginalizes arguments for and against birth control, and therefore marginalizes
discussion of the harms those arguments might bring in their wake. Again, as
discussed above, one would never know, reading Hobby Lobby, that the fully
intended consequence of limiting access to birth control, at least according to the
conception of sexual morality held by the most thoughtful advocates of that goal, is
not only to limit licentious sex, but also to forbid the control of fertility that birth
control facilitates, and to do so, in part, because of a felt desire to valorize even
unwanted pregnancies, as well as the live births to which those pregnancies lead, so
long as that sex is marital. That marginality is consequential. It pushes to the
margins not only the valorization of the sex that causes unwanted pregnancies, but
also the harms borne by the women who suffer them. Again, part of the reason for
that marginality is the “exit right” logic of the right recognized in Hobby Lobby itself:
arguments against birth control are contained within the RFRA right of exemption,
with the consequence being that it is and feels violative of religious liberty to even
venture a discussion of them, much as it is and feels violative of the privacy right
constructed in Griswold through Roe to venture a discussion of the reasons women
might have for wanting to get abortions.
But the phenomenon is broader and the silence is deeper than anything that
can be pinned on Hobby Lobby standing alone. Most striking, the silence extends to
the scholarly as well as advocacy community. Why aren’t we, in the wake of Hobby
Lobby, talking about, and subjecting to criticism, the natural lawyers’ valorization of
the sex, both wanted and unwanted, that leads to unwanted pregnancies? More
generally, why aren’t we talking about the harms of unwanted pregnancy? Isn’t that
what’s at stake, largely, in Hobby Lobby? Isn’t that the cost of the religious freedom
that opinion seeks to protect? There it sits – the cost to women of this exemption -but we don’t touch it – we, meaning all us liberal, feminist, pro-sex, modernist and
postmodernist critics. Again, let me emphasize just the sheer oddity of this. There
is a sizeable body of literature, some of it legal, some empirical, on the correlation of
unwanted pregnancies with bad outcomes for the children who are nonetheless
borne of such pregnancies: the children who are borne from unwanted pregnancies
seem to disproportionately suffer bad health outcomes, lower levels of educational
attainment and future criminal propensities. 73 And, there is a well-established body
See Guttmacher Inst., Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancies in the United States
(Feb. 2015), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-PregnancyUS.html Unintended pregnancy rates are highest among poor and low-income women,
women aged 18–24, cohabiting women and minority women.
Poor women’s high rate of unintended pregnancy results in their also having high rates of
both abortions (52 per 1,000) and unplanned births (70 per 1,000). In 2008, poor women
had an unintended birth rate nearly six times as high as that of higher-income women (at
or above 200% of poverty.) In 2008, women without a high school degree had the highest
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of research on both the financial costs and the risks to women’s mental and physical
health occasioned by unwanted pregnancies. 74 And of course, there is a sizeable
body of critical commentary on the neo-natural lawyers’ conception of sexual
morality, particularly on its condemnation of same-sex sexuality, marriage, and
parenting, as well as of all non-procreative sex generally. But that critical
commentary, both before and after Hobby Lobby, has focused overwhelmingly on
the constraints on sexual liberty, rather than the loss of control over fertility, that
restrictions on the legality or availability of birth control would entail. From the
existing critical and scholarly legal literature on the neo-natural lawyers conception
of sexual morality alone, one would almost undoubtedly get the profoundly false
impression that the most dire or most unfortunate consequence of limiting access to
birth control, is that so doing would clamp down on sexual liberty. That it also
would limit a woman’s control of her own fertility – and that it would do so because
its most thoughtful advocates explicitly celebrate the intrinsic moral worth of all
marital sex, including marital sex that leads to unwanted pregnancies, as well as the
moral worth of those pregnancies themselves -- warrants barely a mention.
Now: why? Why has this prong of the natural lawyers’ brief – that marital sex
that leads to unwanted pregnancies is an unalloyed intrinsic, human, natural, good –
not attracted a more vigorous response from the neo-natural lawyers’
contemporary critics? This is clearly something of a modern phenomenon, meaning
it was not always the case: in the first two thirds of the twentieth century, it was
precisely this aspect of the natural lawyers’ brief that was most vigorously criticized,
both by feminist, public health, and liberal advocates for the legalization of birth
control. And, over the last ten years, the claim that traditional marriage is a
necessary condition of an intrinsically good pregnancy, and of morally salutary childraising, has received quite a bit of critical attention, primarily from advocates of
same sex marriage or of gay and lesbian parenting, and for good reason. 75 It is
certainly reasonable – even plausible -- that two committed parents in a life-long
relationship is a highly desirable (although by no means necessary) background
condition for ideal child-raising. Put the other way around, it is not at all clear that
either traditional marriage or traditional means of conception are necessary for the
morality of a pregnancy: the apparent goodness of marriage, for children, may
simply reside in the commitment of the co-parenting partners to each other and
their children, and the familial stability, as well as the social and economic benefits
unintended pregnancy rate among all educational levels (101 per 1,000 women aged 15–
44), and rates were lower for women with more years of education.
74 Id.; Unintended Pregnancy Prevention, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Feb. 12, 2013) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/UnintendedPregnancy/ (nothing that
unintended pregnancy is associated with increased health risks because the woman
may not in optimal health for childbearing or may delay vital prenatal care).
75 See CARLOS BALL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN: A TALE OF HISTORY, SOCIAL SCIENCE,
AND LAW 76-78 (2014).
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that follow that status. 76 Similarly, plenty of ethicists, liberal feminists, libertarians
and public health scholars have argued that pregnancies that result from either in
vitro fertilization or surrogacy arrangements are not only morally permissible, but
also worthy of celebration, either in or outside of marriage, and they are so no less
than are the pregnancies conceived through sex of the marital form. 77 I don’t mean
to deny that this part of the natural lawyer’s brief – that marriage is a necessary
condition for the morality of a pregnancy-- has gone entirely unnoticed. What
contemporary legal critics have not focused on, however, is parallel to what they
have not focused on in the realm of sex itself: they have not focused on the natural
lawyers’ claim that the marital form is a sufficient condition not only for the morality
of unwanted sex, but also for the morality of that sex, whether wanted or not, that
leads to unwanted pregnancies: the claim, that is, that so long as sex is marital, the
pregnancies that follow, whether wanted or unwanted, are as much an intrinsic
good as the sex itself.
So, why is this? Why has the natural lawyer’s endorsement, and even
celebration, of the intrinsic worth of the sex that leads to unwanted pregnancies not
been subjected to greater critical scrutiny? Surely, one reason may simply be
because of a widespread believe that today the argument lacks practical
significance: the natural lawyers have just flat-out lost this argument, critics might
think, in the court of public opinion, which is really the only court that matters. Or
so we are told. Catholic women, after all, use birth control in the same large
numbers as non-Catholic women, and do so in open defiance of the Catholic
leadership’s counsel, and women with unwanted pregnancies, both in and outside of
marriage, and again both Catholic and non-Catholic, also terminate those unwanted
pregnancies that occur in spite of the use of birth control through abortions in large
numbers. The availability of abortion and the widespread use of birth control may
render the harms occasioned by unwanted pregnancies seemingly trivial, and
therefore marginal – something that perhaps once was a problem but simply is no
longer.
If this is what is grounding the natural lawyers’ critics’ relative lack of
attention to the problems and harms attendant to unwanted pregnancy – that it no
longer much of a problem –the wisdom of that reticence should be re-thought, I

See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS (Oxford University Press, 2014).
77 See LORI B. ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS, EXPECTANT FATHERS,
AND BRAVE NEW BABIES 160 (Harper Collins, 1989) for a support of surrogacy as an
exercise of free choice as “feminist opponents of the practice have relied on
paternalistic theories and speculative information about risks to women and
children…”; Lori B. Andrews, Remaking Conception and Pregnancy: How the Laws
Influence Reproductive Technology, 9 FRONTIERS: A JOURNAL OF WOMEN STUDIES 38
(1986) discussing constitutional protection of private family decisions and the
woman retaining control over her genetic material provides reasons to allow access
to new reproductive technologies); ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, BUILDING POLICY FROM
LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 6 (Columbia University Press, 1989) for an analysis of
safe practices for in vitro fertilization and the effect of expansion on free choice.
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hope for obvious reasons. Almost half of all pregnancies in this country are
unwanted, and about a third of all pregnancies – meaning over half of all unintended
pregnancies -- end in abortion. 78 Those are staggering and staggeringly depressing
numbers, no matter what one’s views on abortion – or rather, they are, if one grants
the harmfulness of unwanted pregnancy. And, most of those unintentional and
unwanted pregnancies occur, furthermore, because of the nonuse or misuse of birth
control: women who use birth control regularly account for only a sliver of the
number of women who suffer from unwanted pregnancies. 79 Moral arguments
against birth control likely account for a substantial (but specifically unknown) part
of that nonuse: the natural lawyer’s brief against birth control has now received a
sympathetic hearing in fundamentalist protestant faith traditions, whose
practitioners increasingly both decry and eschew the use of birth control. More
significantly, though, those moral arguments against birth control underlie the push
for abstinence-only programs, rather than promotion of birth control, and for
abstinence only instruction, rather than instruction in the use of birth control, in sex
education classes in middle and high schools. If the harms of unwanted pregnancies
– and hence the harms of marital sex, as defined and celebrated by natural lawyers - are real, then the natural lawyer’s moral brief against birth control, and the
conception of heterosexual sexual morality that valorizes both the sex within
marriage and the unwanted pregnancies to which it leads, on which that brief is
based, obviously matter.
There may, though, be less obvious reasons as well, for the reticence of the
natural lawyers’ modern critics to address these harms, entirely aside from the
belief, which I think is misguided, that the argument is just too discredited to matter.
The first is the sizeable but unacknowledged shared ground between the pro-sex
commitments of the natural lawyers and their most prominent critics. Pregnancy,
whether wanted or not, according to the natural lawyers, is a consequence of the
intrinsic goodness of a particular kind of sex, which, although narrowly defined, is,
after all, still, nevertheless, sex. The problem with that moral endorsement, from the
perspective of the natural lawyers’ most prominent contemporary critics, is not that
the sex that is endorsed leads to unwanted and harmful pregnancies. 80 Rather, the
problem with the natural lawyer’s endorsement of marital sex that has so captured
the attention and imagination of the natural lawyers’ critics, is that it comes
alongside of a condemnation of all other – all non-marital -- sex. But the
endorsement of marital sex itself gets a pass, as well as the unwanted pregnancies to
which it leads. One reason for this may be that the natural lawyers’ critics, no less
than the natural lawyers themselves, have been remarkably inattentive to the harms
of the forms of sex each side of this divide endorses: the natural lawyers are
inattentive to the harms of marital sex, and their critics are inattentive to the harms
Guttmacher Inst., Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancies in the United States (Feb.
2015), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-PregnancyUS.html
79 Id.
80 Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261
(1995).
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of non-marital sex. What the natural lawyers and their critics may share, then, is a
partial blindness to the harms of the sex each side endorses: for the natural
lawyers, of marital sex, and for their critics, and as I will discuss below, of virtually
all sex, whether or not it is marital, so long as it is consensual. But that obviously
includes marital sex. This is obviously speculative on my part. But nevertheless, it
can’t just be a coincidence or insignificant that the natural lawyers’ critics – many of
whom call themselves proudly “pro-sex” and are always alert to the harms done by
the demonization of sex, are inattentive to the harms caused by the unwanted
pregnancies that are themselves caused by sex: an activity that the critics, certainly
no less than and considerably more than the natural lawyers themselves, generally
celebrate.
Second, many would-be critics on all sides of this debate, I suspect, tend to
regard pregnancies that result from sex in which the parties knowingly fail to use
birth control, and thus knowingly assume the risk of the unwanted pregnancy that
may result, as an “intentional” or at least quasi-intentional pregnancy: the
pregnancy is the result of an act in which parties engaged, knowingly accepting the
risk of its probably consequences. This seems clearly true, for example, of women in
traditional marriages who are morally opposed to the use of artificial birth control
and try, but fail, to control their fertility solely through rhythm methods: if such a
woman becomes pregnant, the critic might reason, she’s laid her bed so now she
must lie in it. Her problems, or injuries, are not of concern, from a liberal
perspective. The same might be thought of women, whether married or not, who
don’t wish to become pregnant, and know full well how birth control works, and
certainly have no moral objection to it, but carelessly or recklessly fail to use it.
Both groups of women in some sense have knowingly assumed a risk of pregnancy.
For both groups, the unwanted pregnancy that results can fairly be regarded as
“consensual.” 81 And, for a host of reasons I’ve discussed elsewhere 82 but which are
beyond the scope here, modern legal scholars generally have difficulty seeing that
unwanted albeit intentional, fully consensual acts – acts that are almost invariably
legal precisely because of their consensuality -- can nevertheless cause harms. We
may be inclined to assume, then, that all such consensual albeit unwanted
pregnancies –pregnancies in which the risk of conception was consciously assumed
-- like all such consensual acts, can’t really cause harm to those who intended them,
anymore than the purchaser of a lottery ticket can be said to have been harmed by
his payment of the purchase price, when the lottery ticket turns out not to be a
For an argument that they are better understood as nonconsensual, see Eileen
McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996).
82 Robin West, Authority Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384(1985);
Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1449 (1986); ROBIN WEST, Sex, Law and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, eds., Oxford University
Press, 2010).
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winner. 83 To assume otherwise, the argument continues, would be unduly
paternalistic: the woman had herself assessed the risk of the pregnancy and had the
sex anyway, so she must have herself calculated that the risk of the pregnancy times
its cost was simply outweighed by the value of the sex that might cause it. Who are
we to second-guess her? If so, then while the unwanted pregnancy may impose a
cost, it can hardly be said to impose a harm: it is a cost for which she was fully
compensated by the pleasure of the sex that brought it about. Thus – the harms of
unwanted pregnancies simply disappear, behind the veil of the apparently
consensual assumption of their risk.
More generally, though, we may, because of a culture-wide bit of cognitive
dissonance – and not just because legal scholars are overly-besotted by economic
definitions of value -- simply fail to see that intentional and fully consensual acts can
impose harms, because we don’t fully understand that we often intend to bring
about states of affairs we don’t ourselves want, and we all may particularly fail to
see this – even semi-consciously refuse to see this -- with respect to women’s
intentional use of their bodies. As a consequence, if I’m right about that, we may
fully understand that truly unintentional pregnancies – such as pregnancies where
birth control is used but fails, or pregnancies that follow a rape, or pregnancies that
occur where birth control is unavailable, or where the parties suffer a profound
ignorance regarding its necessity -- impose cognizable harms. What we may not well
understand, by contrast, is that consensual (or intentional) but nevertheless
unwanted pregnancies, where the risk of an unwanted pregnancy is at least dimly
but nevertheless consciously assumed, either in or outside marriage, and whether
that risk is consciously assumed either because of duty, or because of moral
objections to birth control, or by virtue of pressure from a partner, or from peer
pressure -- also carry with them grave harms. And, one reason we might not see this
is that we have yet to understand that such a category might exist: that we
sometimes intend to bring about states of affairs we don’t want. And, we may have a
particular blind spot – I think we do – when faced with the possibility that women
may do this frequently, and may do so, in fact, very frequently with respect to our
bodies: “our bodies” that, fifty years after that the publication of that book with that
hopeful and buoyant title, we still don’t quite see as “our selves.”
Why might that be the case? Least charitably, and of course fully
speculatively, the psychic or emotional harms occasioned by intentional but
unwanted pregnancies may elide notice simply because the use of women’s bodies
for reproductive or sexual ends that are disjoined from women’s own desires strikes
us all, and not just natural lawyers, as an acceptable distribution of societal
resources, or as central to a laudable understanding of femininity, or both, at least so
long as the pregnancy can be characterized, somehow, as at least nominally
intentional. A woman who sacrifices her own interests, career, pleasures, self

The example is taken from Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (198o), and
criticized in Robin West, Authority Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV.
384(1985).
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sovereignty, autonomy, and integrity for a pregnancy she does not want is, after all,
at least on one interpretation, simply engaging in a distinctive form of altruism – an
altruism that might well be distinctively unchosen (even if the risk of it was
consensually assumed) and hence distinctively illiberal, as well as distinctively
female. A woman who bears an unwanted but consensual pregnancy has not
decided to share her body with that of another and then taken actions that will allow
her to do so, as we might at the end of the year decide to share our income with
others in need, and then write the checks that enable us to do so. She has, rather,
assumed a risk that something she does not want – a pregnancy – might follow from
an act she may engage in – sex. The result – the pregnancy – forces her into an
altruistic sharing of her body’s resources. Again, women who do this routinely and
as a matter of self-identity or self-definition, are thus engaging in a form of altruism
that is both distinctively female and distinctively illiberal. That is just not a
coincidental pairing. The identification of female (rather than male) altruism with
unchosen and sometimes forced sharing, rather than with chosen giving, is a deep
one. For a very long period in human history, in fact, that distinctive mode of ethics
– forced altruism, particularly forced altruism regarding the body’s resources -- has
been a large part of what has defined not just femininity, but also, and more
specifically, the deep incompatibility of femininity with liberal ways of being in the
world.
And, that forced sharing – that feminine, unchosen, physical altruism -- is
right at the heart of the natural lawyers’ conception of femininity, of family, and
ultimately of their opposition to birth control. Thus, female sacrifice (up to and
definitely including the sacrifice of life itself) is explicitly and emphatically praised
in the 1930 encyclical – a woman who passively sacrifices her health and perhaps
her life for the sake of an unwanted pregnancy is to be much admired, but certainly
not pitied – she will, after all, receive her reward for her sacrifice in heaven -- while
the woman who willfully seeks to avoid a pregnancy or end one because of health or
life is to be condemned as having committed a grave sin. Continuing through to
today, this particular form of forced altruism, again explicitly for the natural lawyers
but likely in some form implicitly for many of the rest of us as well, is simply part of
what it means to be a wife. A wife just is someone who engages in physical altruism,
and who does so by virtue of status rather than consent. But whether or not that’s a
matter of common understanding, this understanding of what it means to be a
“wife” is quite explicit in the encyclicals, and it might be implicit in the neo-natural
lawyers’ failure to recognize the harms of unwanted pregnancy as harms at all, and
thus to temper or condition their valorization of marital sex. The same set of
assumptions, however, might also haunt, and limit, the critical literature on the neo
natural lawyers’ conception of heterosexual morality.
Whatever the reason for it, though, the lack of attention of both the natural
lawyers and their critics to the harms caused by all of those unwanted pregnancies
that are themselves caused by marital sex – meaning, again, procreative,
uncontracepted sex of the marital form -- is just flat-out odd. It’s peculiar. Until
recently – maybe until the latest wave of birth control litigation -- it was widely
understood that the very point of birth control is to limit the number of unwanted
pregnancies, and that a major cost of the constraints on the availability of birth
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control, whether resulting from exemptions grounded in RFRA, or because of
taxpayer dollars going instead to ineffectual abstinence-only campaigns, or because
of budgetary cutbacks in public health programs both in the schools and the larger
communities, is that the number of such pregnancies would rise, and that surely
that would be a bad thing. As we move into a world in which some women but not
others have access to birth control, greater understanding of its point and
knowledge of its effectiveness, and greater choice among its forms, we will thereby
be moving into a world not only of unequal sexual freedom, but also of unequal
control of fertility. In such a world more women will have unwanted pregnancies,
whether intended or not. And, perhaps it needs saying although it shouldn’t, most of
those women who will bear those unwanted pregnancies will be poor. This is a
harm, which we should reckon.
To sum this up: as is now fairly widely acknowledged, marriage is not a
necessary condition for the morality of any and all pregnancies that may result from
sex. This part of the natural lawyer’s conception of sex has been widely criticized,
and our law, our politics, and our legal attitudes all reflect that rejection. We don’t
any longer stigmatize illegitimacy, or sequester our pregnant and unmarried
daughters, or emblazon scarlet letters on unmarried pregnant women’s dresses or
foreheads. We celebrate the in vitro or surrogacy pregnancies sought and treasured
by both our straight and gay friends, partners, and selves. What has not been so
widely criticized, because it is so rarely discussed, is the natural lawyer’s valorizing
claim that marriage is also a sufficient condition, not only for the morality of the
unwanted sex that takes place within it, but also for the wanted or unwanted sex
that leads to unwanted pregnancies that are its natural and completely foreseeable
result. But this claim too is wrong and even clearly wrong. It is surely wrong to
valorize nonconsensual sex – meaning rape -- within marriage, and I have argued
elsewhere and will argue below that it is wrong as well to valorize unwanted sex,
both marital and non-marital. But it is also wrong to valorize the marital sex,
whether wanted or unwanted, that may lead to unwanted pregnancies. Whether
inside or outside marriage, a wanted pregnancy is of far greater moral value – it is
more joyous, it is less harmful, it is less costly and it is more emotionally and
spiritually uplifting – than an unwanted pregnancy. The ideal conditions for a
pregnancy are straightforward enough and widely understood: a pregnancy should
be supported by loving parents-to-be, the pregnant woman should be in good
health, there should be ample and planned provision for the child’s nutrition,
housing and schooling, and there should be substantial time in both parents’ lives to
devote to the work of child-raising. But as a moral minimum, a pregnancy, like sex,
should be wanted. It should be desired. It should be celebrated by the woman
herself and welcomed by her partner. The natural lawyers’ celebration of the
morality of all marital sex, including the marital sex that causes unwanted
pregnancies, fails to recognize this moral minimum.
What to do about this? As I will suggest in the Conclusion below, one limited
reform that might be amenable to natural lawyers would be a friendly amendment
to the underlying conception of sexual morality that motivates the condemnation of
birth control, so as to at least acknowledge that either a woman’s or man’s lack of
desire for sex should be understood as a moral condition for marital sex. Marital sex
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should be mutually wanted, and any reason for not wanting it, including both the
woman’s (or man’s) lack of desire for the sex, but also the woman’s (or man’s) lack
of desire for the pregnancy that might follow, should be honored. Another way to
put it, perhaps, is that a woman’s lack of desire to be pregnant should be regarded as
irrefutably a reasonable one, and her lack of desire for sex that might cause it should
be likewise so regarded, and honored. Any conception of heterosexual morality,
including the natural lawyer’s, should incorporate such a condition. The bottom
line, morally, would just be this: don’t have un-contracepted sex, if you don’t want
either the sex or the pregnancy that might follow. The rhythm method, in other
words, should be regarded as not just morally permissible, but morally required. A
recognition of this moral constraint alone would go some way toward lowering the
incidence of unwanted sex and unwanted pregnancy both.
A second and more ambitious reform, though – a less friendly amendment -would be to loosen the prohibition on artificial birth control. The use of birth
control makes it somewhat more likely that all of the conditions of an ideal
pregnancy are met, but it virtually guarantees one such condition: its use makes it
far more likely that a pregnancy will be desired. That is, after all, its point. Birth
control doesn’t simply facilitate unfettered recreational or affective sex. What birth
control does, is make wanted pregnancies more likely, and unwanted pregnancies
less likely, for healthy and unhealthy women alike. It reduces the profound harms
done, to women, by unwanted pregnancies. For that reason alone, the natural
lawyers are wrong to oppose its use and the natural lawyers’ critics are wrong not
to hold them accountable for doing so. And, the government is most assuredly
wrong not to highlight – even insist -- that the prevention of these harms – the harms
done by an unwanted, whether or not intentional pregnancy, and whether or not it
would undermine the woman’s health -- is indeed the primary and moral point of
birth control: it is the reason most people use it, and it is why the state has a
compelling interest in seeing to it that they can access it. Whatever the harms and
costs that have been visited upon us by virtue of the invention of reliable artificial
birth control, this contribution to the quality of our lives is profound: birth control
promises, and delivers, what nineteenth century feminists -- who generally opposed
it, primarily because they thought that within a patriarchal context it would be
ineffectual -- called “voluntary motherhood.” 84 Motherhood, which they honored
and quite genuinely valued – should never be involuntary. With birth control, a
heterosexual woman whether within a traditional marriage or not has the power to
only become pregnant when she wants to have a child. Marriage, that promises so
much of value for our lives, can’t promise that.
c. The Sexual-Libertarian Brief for Birth Control

The libertarian brief for the use and dispensation of birth control, like the
natural lawyers’ argument against it, also rests on a particular -- but of course very
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different -- conception of heterosexual morality. All sex, according to the sexual
libertarian, including all heterosexual sex, is an intrinsic human good, and a good to
which all individuals are entitled, so long as the sexual transactions that facilitate it
are fully consensual acts, and are therefore conducive to, as well as a product of,
individual autonomy. The formal parallelism of this conception with the natural
lawyer’s conception is striking. The sexual libertarian, like the natural lawyer,
believes that sex is intrinsically good so long as it is (x), but while for the natural
lawyer, that (x) is, broadly, marriage, for the sexual libertarian, that (x) – the
condition for the morality of sex – is consent, or, broadly, autonomy. For the natural
lawyer, sex must be of the reproductive form – and therefore marital -- to be moral,
and and for the sexual libertarian, sex must be consensual – and therefore conducive
to autonomy – to be moral. And, as was true of the natural lawyer’s, the libertarian’s
conception of sexual morality quite cleanly breaks down into both a censorial and a
valorizing claim, and again, as was true of the natural lawyer’s, both the censorial
and the valorizing claim are foundational to their argument regarding the use of
birth control.
The sexual libertarian’s censorial claim is this: Sex that is not consensual is
immoral, because it interferes with human autonomy, and, because of liberal legal
reforms of the last thirty years, it is increasingly likely to be illegal as well: in liberal
reform jurisdictions, nonconsensual sex is rape, and it is rape regardless of whether
or not a woman resisted to the utmost, or whether physical force was employed, or
whether or not the victim was a sex worker, or whether she was black or white or
brown, or whether the parties were married, knew each other, or were out on a
date. But more fundamentally, whatever the reach of the law, non-consensual sex,
in the “liberal imagination,” is clearly wrong, because it interferes with autonomy,
just as is nonmarital sex, to the natural lawyer, including contracepted sex within
marriage, because of its interference with the fusion of body and spirit necessary to
the actualization of the moral good of marriage. Again its worth noting the
parallelism with the natural lawyer’s censorial claim: for the natural lawyer, sex that
is not marital is therefore immoral, for the libertarian, sex that is not consensual is
what we should condemn.
The sexual libertarian’s valorizing claim is just this: Sex that is consensual is
not only “not rape,” and not immoral, but it is also conducive to autonomy, and
because it is conducive to autonomy it is an intrinsic human good. Consensual or
autonomous sex (hereinafter, “autonomous sex,” for short) is not simply
permissible; it is of great positive value. Autonomous sex should be celebrated,
then, (not just permitted) and in all its forms and varieties. Its moral value is not
dependent upon any further conditions. It clearly doesn’t have to be procreative,
either in form or fact; it doesn’t have to be open to the blossoming of a new life, it
doesn’t, therefore, have to be non-contracepted. It doesn’t have to be heterosexual,
missionary, penile-vaginal or penetrative. It doesn’t have to be reproductive,
marital, or emotive. It doesn’t have to have any particular form, or motive, or end. It
doesn’t have to be within a committed long-term relationship, or any relationship,
and it certainly doesn’t have to be within marriage. It can also be – although it
doesn’t have to be – instrumental toward some end other than the pleasurable or
reproductive consequence of the sex itself: it can be enjoyed or traded for money,
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for security, for friendship, or for love, no less than for pleasure. Sex is not though,
simply a commodity, the trade of which is conducive to wealth. Rather, within the
libertarian conception, and certainly within the libertarian imagination,
autonomous sex, like speech, belief and association is not just a source of wealth and
it is not just a source of pleasure. It is also a source of meaning, of expression, and of
individual identity. 85 It is a part of the inalienable liberty to which we are entitled as
a matter of birthright. In short, we have a human right to it, and at least post
Eisenstadt and all the more emphatically since Lawrence, we seem to have a
constitutional right to it as well. 86 So long as it is consensual, sex, according to the
valorizing prong of the liberal conception, whether or not it is hetero, missionary, or
vaginal-penetrative in form, and whether or not it is for pay, for pleasure, for
reproduction, or otherwise, is a great human good. Consensual sex is of positive
human value, at least to the participants and possibly to the rest of us as well.
How do these claims jointly ground the libertarian brief for birth control?
They overlap, but nevertheless, each claim supports a different part of the total
argument. The right to use birth control, free of the constraining and condemning
arm of the state – the right essentially created in Griswold and Eisenstadt – follows
directly from a combination of traditionally liberal or Millian arguments regarding
the moral limits on state power over acts that impose no harms on third persons,
with the content – and limits -- of the sexual libertarian’s censorial claim.
Heterosexual sex is wrong, according to the sexual libertarian, if it is nonconsensual,
but only if it is nonconsensual: if it is nonconsensual, it is assaultive, and like all
assaults by definition imposes harms. Therefore, consensual (and therefore nonassaultive) but non-procreative and hence contracepted sex, no less than consensual
and therefore non-assaultive but procreative sex, or sex for pleasure, or sex for love,
or sex for companionship, or sex for money, is just not in the category of the kinds or
forms of sex, or any other kinds of victimless acts, which we should censor or
condemn. The use of birth control, then, is not an affirmative moral wrong. We
shouldn’t criminalize it obviously; but nor should we criticize it; there’s really
nothing to criticize. There’s no sensible moral argument against its use. Eisenstadt,
David A.J. Richards, Sex, Drugs, Death, and the Law: An Essay on Human Rights
and Overcriminalization 41 (1986) (“Such activity is clearly a natural expression of
human sexual competences and sensitivities… To deny the acceptability of such acts
is itself a human evil, a denial of the distinctive human capacities for loving and
sensual experience without ulterior procreative motives-in a plausible sense, itself
unnatural”); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). But see
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
86 See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v.
Texas,2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21-41., for a critical reading of the sexual
libertarianism explicit in Lawrence, see Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v.
Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1629 (2004) for a discussion of how the Court
vindicates sexual liberty by recognizing heterosexuals’ sexual rights and extending
that liberty to lesbians and gay men., sometimes to the detriment of safety.
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of course, constitutionalized a part of this claim, albeit obliquely. 87 If constitutional
privacy protects anything at all, it should protect the use of birth control: it is a
paradigmatic instance of self-regarding behavior that is both central to identity and
inflicts no harms on others.
The argument for the accessibility and dispensation of birth control, however
– rather than just for its decriminalization -- obviously doesn’t and can’t follow from
the libertarian’s censorial claim alone: that the use of contraception (and
contracepted sex) is not a moral wrong, and should not be a legal wrong, might
imply that we should not criminalize it and should perhaps constitutionalize a right
to it, but it obviously doesn’t follow from the limits of the censorial claim that birth
control is such a good thing that it should be made broadly available, through
mandatory insurance schemes or otherwise. The argument for the dispensation of
birth control (rather than just its legality), however, does follow, and quite directly,
from the libertarian’s valorizing claim regarding the high positive value of
autonomous sex. Because autonomous sex is an intrinsic human good, anything that
liberates autonomous sex is of value, and anything that confines it, is a cost.
Pregnancy and the fear of pregnancy obviously greatly inhibit heterosexual sex and
sexual expression. Birth control frees us from those fears and consequences, and
thus frees heterosexual women and men both for the autonomous sex, sexual
expression and sexual pleasure to which we are all entitled. 88 Birth control, in short,
is facilitative of sexual liberty. 89 Therefore, birth control is not only not a wrong, but
it is of great instrumental utility – it facilitates the enjoyment of a basic human
good. 90 If so, then we seemingly have not only a constitutional right to its use, but at
least a moral right as well to its dispensation.
In the next section below, I will make a general argument against both the
valorizing prong of the sexual libertarian’s conception of heterosexual morality, and
the particular argument for the instrumental value of birth control which it implies
– not because I disagree with its pragmatic bottom line –I fully support the birth
control mandate in the ACA -- but because, in my view, the argument overstates the
connection between sexuality and liberty, slights the harms to women that are
inherent within the conception of heterosexual morality on which the brief rests,
and ultimately badly distracts us from the need to assert and defend the stronger
moral case for the dispensation of birth control, which ought to rest on its
For an argument that although this was how the decision was widely read, that
this was likely not what the Court intended, see Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization
and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1980).
88 Thus, David Richards argued in the aftermath of Eisenstadt that birth control is of
such high value in large part because it frees women to enjoy sex, without fear of
pregnancy, and perhaps for the first time in history. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 259 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
89 DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF
ROE V. WADE (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
87

David Richard makes this argument directly, albeit briefly, in David A.J. Richards,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 259-60 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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facilitation of a woman’s control of her own fertility, rather than the enhancement of
sexual liberty. As a result, I will argue, the sexual libertarian’s account of the utility
of birth control has real costs, one of which is that it doesn’t go far enough toward
establishing – or even articulating -- a firm moral foundation for a woman’s control
over her own fertility. 91 Before turning to those arguments, however,
The sexual libertarian’s argument for the legalization and dispensation of birth
control – that birth control has great social utility because it facilitates autonomous
sexuality, which is in turn an intrinsic human good – is not the only possible
argument for the dispensation of birth control. It is, for example, most decidedly not
the argument pressed by the United States government in the Hobby Lobby case or
articulated in the Affordable Care Act itself, which seemed to go out of their way to
avoid it – as noted above, the argument pressed in those for a by the government is
that the utility of birth control lies in its contributions to women’s health, not its
facilitation of sexual liberty. And, I will argue below that the strongest case for the
social and individual utility of birth control – and hence for its dispensation -- lies
precisely in what both accounts – the sexual libertarian’s celebration of sexual
liberty and the public health administrator’s invocation of women’s health – elide,
and that is its enhancement of women’s control over their own fertility. That is
hardly a new claim; it is basically the same claim that was made by feminists in the
birth control movement during the entire first half of the twentieth century.
But this doesn’t make the sexual libertarian’s quite different, even if
obviously related argument – that birth control has utility because it liberates sexual
expression – unimportant (or even worse, a strawman), and for two reasons. First,
from the popular press, and particularly from critics of the birth control mandate, it
seems to be widely assumed that something like the sexual libertarian’s brief for
birth control is the unstated argument behind the mandate itself – that while the
mandate talks in terms of women’s health, its actual rationale must be something
else (since the mandate is not limited to a requirement that employers make birth
control available only where it is required for health reasons) and that actual
rationale just must be a commitment to sexual liberty.
91 While this is often expressed in contemptuous and offensive ways, it is
nevertheless not an unreasonable assumption: as Thomas Grey argued several
decades ago, something like what I’m calling the sexual libertarian’s brief was
widely read into the Eisenstadt and Griswold opinions, not by the Rush Limbaughs of
the world, but rather, by the sizeable community of professional liberal readers in
the legal academy, as the actual, albeit not clearly stated, rationale for those
decisions. Likewise, the sexual libertarian’s account of those cases – meaning, an
account of Griswold and Eisenstadt as resting on a commitment to sexual liberty,
rather than to either control of fertility or women’s health -- was also, according to
David Garrow’s meticulous history of the period, the understanding and the hopedfor understanding of Griswold held by a number of the litigators of that famous case.
And, perhaps most consequentially it is the interpretation that was at least
implicitly embraced by the Court’s decision decades later in Lawrence. It is, in other
words, widely believed, not just by natural lawyers and a handful of crude radio talk
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I want to distinguish more fully what I’ve called the “censorial prong” of the sexual
libertarian’s conception of sexual morality, from the valorizing claim. The
libertarian’s censorial claim -- that consent is a necessary condition for moral (as
well as legal) sex, such that all nonconsensual sex is immoral and (in most cases)
illegal -- as well as the law reform movements it has motivated, have given rise,
over the last forty years, to a cottage industry of intra-liberal and intra-libertarian
scholarly critique and political agitation. I want to make clear that the argument I
will be making here does not address those debates, all of which I have addressed in
detail elsewhere. Nor will I be addressing the argument for the legalization of brith
control based on the limits of the libertarian’s censorial claim: the argument, that is,

show hosts, but also by sexual libertarians themselves, and scores of legal theorists,
as well as a wide swath of the general public, that at least a significant part of the
case for both our constitutional right to birth control, and whether or not people are
willing to say so, is that it liberates autonomous sex from an otherwise inhibiting
material condition – the condition of pregnancy itself. It is not a huge leap from that
understanding of those constitutional cases to the conclusion that the same
argument must therefore underlie the case for its dispensation as well. I believe this
is wrong – that sexual liberty is not the best argument for the birth control mandate,
or even an argument for it – and importantly so, for reasons I will discuss. But it
seems to me incontrovertible that something like the sexual libertarian’s brief is at
the heart of the constitutional right to the use of birth control, and at the heart of the
policy behind its dispensation.
But the sexual libertarian’s brief for birth control is important for a second
reason as well. Whatever the role the sexual libertarian’s argument plays in our
understanding of constitutional doctrine, and whatever the role it plays in our
arguments over the mandate, it rests on a conception of the intrinsic value of
autonomous sexuality that has come to have independent strength, significance and
importance. Other commitments can be and are readily inferred from it, including
most prominently the morality of gay sex and the case for gay marriage. The sexual
libertarian’s brief for birth control, in other words, is important not only for the role
it is playing in the development of our law, but also because of the general claim
about the morality of sexuality on which it rests, and the important implications that
can be drawn from it. Birth control and gay marriage seemingly rise and fall
together: for both sexual libertarians and sexual conservatives, they are both
premised on the sexual libertarian’s claim regarding the morality of heterosexuality.
They are therefore widely regarded as mutually supportive – the strength of the
claim for birth control bolsters the strength of the cases for gay sex and gay
marriage – and mutually endangered. A weakening of the case for or the
commitment to birth control, on this view, threatens the commitment to gay
marriage. The sexual libertarian’s brief for birth control is thus important because it
seemingly rests on a conception of sexual morality that grounds the case for gay sex
and gay marriage as well. If the former is weak so is the latter; we must protect the
former, then, if we value the latter. So, the argument matters, even if it’s not the best
argument that might be pressed for birth control – I think its not, and will so argue
below -- but the argument matters, for its negative collateral damage.
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that the use of birth control is victimless and like all other such conduct, both sexual
and otherwise, should not be criminalized. I completely agree. Here, I will be
making an argument instead against the libertarian’s valorizing claim and the
particular argument for the dispensation of birth control, which it implies. I think
it’s a bad argument with unfortunate implications, but again, I don’t disagree with its
conclusion. I don’t, that is, disagree with the ACA’s birth control mandate itself. But
first, I want to give more texture to the censorial claim, partly so as to emphasize the
distinction between them. The valorizing claim, which I will criticize, and the
censorial claim, which I will not, are often conflated, or – even more commonly –
believed to entail the other. They don’t entail the other, and they should not be
conflated.
So again, the valorizing claim is that autonomous sex is an intrinsic good, the
censorial claim is that nonconsensual sex is a violation of autonomy and is always
bad. Occasionally there is outright opposition to the libertarian’s censorial claim –
the claim, that is, that nonconsensual sex is always immoral, and with only a few
narrowly drawn exceptions (if that) ought to be illegal as well. Some social
conservatives, for example, argued as late as the 1980s, in response to campaigns to
abolish the marital rape exemption, that a requirement of consent within marriage
would be an undue imposition on what ought to be a patriarchal privilege, or that it
would impermissibly invade marital privacy, or that blanket consent is given to all
marital sex at the altar, thus obviating any need for consent to particular sexual acts
during the course of the marriage. 92 Similarly, until the 1970s, or thereabouts, the
law of rape in most states required, in addition to the lack of consent, some requisite
degree of force on the part of the aggressor and some amount of resistance on the
part of the victim: if a woman had not resisted, and a man had not used force, there
was no rape, regardless of the presence or absence of consent. Thus, nonconsensual
sex alone, according to the conception of heterosexual morality that underlaid that
legal scheme, is not what should be condemned, rather, it is forced sex, or violent
sex, or forced sex between strangers, or, putting these together, forced sex between
strangers that is vigorously resisted by the victim, that should be understood as
wrong or criminal. These traditional requirements of the law of rape had their
defenders well into the last quarter of the last century and occasional defenders in
the first quarter of this one as well. 93 In the 1990s and 2000s, however, critique of
the familiar libertarian claim that consent is a necessary condition of moral sex, such
that the lack of consent is sufficient for sex to be so wrongful as to be rape, has come
from a different political quarter: some queer theorists have either resisted the
necessity of consent to the morality of sex, or sought to define the consent that is
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1373 (2000); Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990); Note, To Have and to Hold: The
Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1268
(1986).
93 On force requirement, see Jed Rubenfeld, Rape-by-Deception—A Response, 123
YALE L.J. ONLINE 389 (2013).
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required so broadly as to render it almost meaningless. Foucault, for example,
argued that even a child should be presumed to consent to the sexual advances of an
adult unless he or she fights back quite strenuously 94; and David Kennedy has
argued in a similar mode that we should stop “fetishizing” consent in our adult
sexual lives. 95
More widely, queer theorists and some sexual libertarians themselves have
worried that legal attempts to define consent in such a way that it must be clearly
communicated in order to be legally effective, such as through yes means yes or no
means no campaigns or through broadened definitions of sexual harassment,
unduly cramp sexual expression. 96 And finally, even aside from disputes over the
contours of rape law, the (to some of us) banal liberal and libertarian idea that
consent, or more broadly, respect for autonomy, is a necessary condition of moral
sex has sparked some controversy and unease. Good sex, some critics say, whether
we mean that “good” hedonistically or morally, doesn’t feel all that autonomous;
good sex feels like the sort of thing we get “swept up” in rather than something we
choose; it feels like something that we are compelled to do, and the better the sex all
the more strongly that hotly desirable feeling of compulsion. 97 What can consent
possibly have to do with all that? Autonomy itself -- and therefore consent, if
consent is its proxy -- regardless of how we should define rape, doesn’t seek like a
very good descriptive account of the sex that at least many of us, much of the time,
both enjoy and find morally unproblematic. However one defines the lack of
consent that might suffice to render sex rape, its not at all obvious that autonomy is
the value behind the sex we enjoy, or even that its anywhere in sight. For many of
us, in fact, quite the contrary seems to be true, as all those bestselling Shades of Grey
novels pretty clearly attest. And if that’s true, perhaps consent is not quite the
necessary condition for good sex that so many feminists and so many liberals, in
rape reform movements all over the country and throughout the last half-century,
have believed it to be. That fact alone has caused a fissure of sorts between liberal
and liberal feminist understandings of the necessity of consent to moral sex, and pro
sex and queer theorists more phenomenological account of the seeming tension
between that claim, and the feel of sex itself. Consent, and autonomy, doesn’t “feel”
necessary to the enjoyment of sex – quite the contrary in fact -- therefore, perhaps it
isn’t necessary to the morality of it as well.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE, INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS,
1977- 84 (Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed., New York: Routledge 1988) 204-05.
95 David Kennedy, piece in book on Clinton Impeachment (I’ll supply)
96 JANET E. HALLEY, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
(Catherine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., Yale University Press, 2002); Janet E.
Halley, Harvard’s New Sexual Harassment Policy Must Change, WBUR, COGNOSCENTI
(Nov. 14, 2014), available at http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2014/11/14/sexualharassment-harvard-university-janet-halley.
97 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
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I do not want to address or be read as addressing those controversies here; I
have elsewhere. 98 Instead I want to look more closely and more critically at the
libertarian’s valorizing claim, which, unlike the censorial claim, is broadly shared, by
liberals, sexual libertarians, pro-sex feminists, and queer theorists all, and on which
is built the libertarian case for the instrumental value of birth control, and hence the
argument for its broad-based dispensation. Over the last half-century, the sexual
libertarian’s valorizing claim regarding autonomous sex – by which I mean its
embrace of autonomous sexuality as an intrinsic human good -- has either implicitly
or explicitly informed a number of pro-sex, liberalizing legal reforms, beginning
with, but then moving well beyond the birth control movement itself. 99 It has, most
recently, been at the heart (although not always explicitly so) of the various legal
and political movements that have challenged moralistic censure of gay and lesbian
sex: if consensual sex is an intrinsic good, then consensual gay sex is as well. 100 It
has likewise motivated and informed the liberal feminist campaign 101 against the
various antipornography ordinances that were drafted by radical feminists in the
nineteen eighties, and that were aimed at providing women a private cause of action
against pornographers. 102 If the sex depicted in pornography is consensual on all
sides, according to liberal feminist anti-censorship theorists and activists, then not

Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149 (2000); ROBIN WEST, Sex, Law and
Consent, in The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice 221–50 (Franklin G. Miller &
Alan Wertheimer, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Robin West,
Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2006); Robin West, Law’s
Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385 (2005).
99 David Richards for example discusses birth control, and its instrumental value for
the enjoyment of autonomous sex, only very briefly, in DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 259(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). He
doesn’t even mention much less discuss or take seriously the possibly deleterious
effects of that argument. Other sexual libertarians give it shorter treatments or
none at all. David Garrow’s legal history of birth control, tellingly titled SEXUALITY
AND LIBERTY, is a meticulous history of the sexual libertarian case for birth control.
Again, he does not provide any discussion at all of the claim’s limitations, nor does
he discuss the critical views of others, other than those of conservative sexual
moralists opposed to birth control.
100 David A. J. Richards, Women, Gays, and the Constitution (University of Chicago
Press, 1998); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 270-71 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Chai Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for
Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005); CARLOS BALL, SAMESEX MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN: A TALE OF HISTORY, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND LAW 76-78 (2014);
Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261 (1995).
101 FACT Amicus Brief, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985).
102 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
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only does it do no harm, but it is also serves (and is) an intrinsic good: sexual
expression, like sex itself, is conducive to full and rich lives for women as well as for
men, unlike the censorial impulse that seeks to repress it, and pornography, so long
as it is consensual, facilitates that expression. 103 The same commitment has
likewise been at the core of a number of self-labelled “pro-sex-feminist” legal
arguments of the eighties and nineties, including critiques of the “hostile
environment” prong of sexual harassment law 104 and of perceived excesses in the
reach of feminist reforms of rape law, both of which, according to pro-sex feminists,
endanger the free expression of sexuality. 105 Likewise, it is the foundation for queer
theorists’ internal challenges to the liberal campaign for same sex marriage: that
campaign is obviously committed to a domesticated and assimilated form of gay
sexuality, that willingly embraces explicitly conservative constraints on sexual
expression outside of marriage. 106 At the more extreme margins, the valorizing
claim has been at the center of queer critiques of the safe sex campaigns
encouraging the use of condoms among gay men. 107 Again, the logic of all of these
pro-sex movements rests on the valorizing prong of the liberal conception of sex:
Autonomous sex is an intrinsic human good. Consent may or may not be a necessary
condition for moral sex; on that, sexual libertarians and queer theorists sometimes
split. But it is clearly a sufficient condition for the morality of sexual acts. On that,
they all agree. Autonomous sex is very, very good, including autonomous
heterosexual sex. And, because it is so good, birth control, which liberates it, is of
high instrumental value. Autonomous sex is a human good, and therefore
contracepted heterosexual sex is likewise, simply because birth control provides the
means by which heterosexual sex can be all the more unconstrained.
Now, unlike the censorial claim, neither the libertarian valorization of
autonomous, non-procreative heterosexual sex nor the argument for the utility of
birth control that it implies, has been subjected to much criticism, or even much
discussion, within liberalism itself – in fact, there’s virtually none. In this way too,
the parallel with the neo-natural lawyer’s conception of heterosexual morality is
striking: just as the harms caused by marital sex have been unnoticed or unreckoned by neo-natural lawyers, so the harms caused by autonomous
heterosexuality have largely been unnoticed or unreckoned by sexual libertarians.

FACT Amicus Brief, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985); Robin West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the
1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 681 (1987).
104 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998);
KATHERINE M. FRANKE, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691
(1997).
105 Jed Rubenfeld, Rape-by-Deception—A Response, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 389 (2013).
106 MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press 2000).
107 For discussion, see Marc Spindelman, Sexual Freedom’s Shadows, 23 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 179 (2011).
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Liberals, sexual libertarians, queer theorists, and pro-sex feminists have argued
instead, and incessantly, over the meaning and limits and implications for law of the
libertarian’s censorial claim: what “counts” as consent, what might be the markers
of non-consent, and whether non-consent is or isn’t sufficient to render sex criminal.
Does yes mean yes, and does no mean no? 108 What is and what should be the
consequence of mistakenly interpreting a “no” as a “yes”? Does deceit, like force,
sufficiently vitiate consent so as to render the sex to which it may lead a crime? 109
They have looked minutely, to borrow Alan Wertheimer’s phrase, at the “morally
transformative” function of consent in the criminal law and in positive morality
both: the way in which consent, and the permission it conveys, transforms what
would otherwise be immoral and possibly illegal assaultive behavior into something
that is at least permitted. 110 They have examined, criticized, torn apart, dissected,
deconstructed and reconstructed the censorial claim, in other words, minutely (and
well beyond, in my own view, any reasonable need to do so. Yes, all sex should be
consensual. No, it doesn’t follow from that, that all non-consensual sex should be
criminal, or criminalized to the same degree. Non-consensual sex that is obtained
through deceit that vitiates consent should not be criminal, and for the most part it
isn’t. And of course there should be degrees of criminality for the nonconsensual
sex that is and should be criminal: some forms of nonconsensual sex are more
harmful than other forms of nonconsensual sex. And yes, autonomous sex includes
sado-masochistic sex that paradoxically has all the trappings of nonconsensuality –
handcuffs, whips, chains and so on. Consensually enacted rape isn’t rape anymore
than its slavery. There’s room for disagreement here, but perhaps less than
contestants imagine.).
Given the elaborate care with which sexual libertarians have examined the
censorial claim, it is all the more striking that they haven’t looked nearly so closely,
and almost never critically, at the sex they valorize. And because of that, they have
not looked at the harms that might be intensified by their particular argument for
the instrumental utility of birth control. What does the liberal’s blanket approval of
autonomous, non-procreative heterosexual sex (hereinafter, autonomous sex), in all
its guises, cover? What harms does it legitimate? The next section attempts a broad
outline of what those harms might be, and concludes with suggestions of how to
minimize them, including an examination and reconstruction of the libertarian’s
brief for birth control.
Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, THE NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY REVIEW, Nov. 15,
2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandlingrape.html?_r=0.
109 Jed Rubenfeld, Rape-by-Deception—A Response, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 389 (2013).
110 ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); Alan Wertheimer, Consent and Sexual Relations, PHILOSOPHY
OF SEX: CONTEMPORARY READINGS, (Alan Soble, ed., Lanham and Boulder: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, 2002)
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d. Is Autonomous Sex an Intrinsic Good? One Critique
Heterosexual sex that is unambiguously consensual – in short, “autonomous
sex” -- may nevertheless be harmful. A few of those harms are recognized, and
much discussed, by liberals and conservatives both: autonomous sex can, after all,
cause both sexually transmitted disease and, if birth control fails or is misused,
unhealthy as well as unwanted and unwise pregnancies. Because of both, it can
sometimes have quite disastrous consequences; it can alter the course of a life, or
end one. Liberals and libertarians who valorize autonomous sex of course realize
this, and that realization grounds their argument for the instrumental utility of birth
control. Because unhealthy, unwise, and unwanted pregnancies can result from
autonomous sex, birth control has great instrumental utility: it is, in effect, a
material condition for the autonomous heterosexual sex that they valorize.
Contraception, then, is not just “not wrong.” It is materially necessary for the
realization of a natural human good: autonomous sex that is free of both
reproductive consequences and free of the worry and fear of those consequences.
Such sex is a positive good, and birth control is necessary to enjoy it. Sexual
libertarians are not, in short, blind to the harms of harmful pregnancies, quite the
contrary. Those harms are central to their brief for the instrumental value of birth
control.
But are there nevertheless harms attendant to autonomous sex, to which
they are inattentive? I believe there are, and that they are almost never even
acknowledged or named – much less addressed -- within liberal and libertarian
discourses on sex and sexual morality. There are two -- and they echo the harms
risked by marital sex. First, autonomous sex may be unwanted even if it is not rape,
just as might marital sex. And second, autonomous sex might lead to unwanted
pregnancy, either because of the failure of birth control, a decision not to use it for
moral or financial reasons, or a failure to use it correctly because of recklessness or
ignorance. I’ll take up these two harms in that order.
So, first, autonomous sex, like marital sex, might be unwanted, and when it is,
it might be harmful. A girl or woman may consent to sex with her boyfriend or
partner for some of the same reasons a wife may consent to unwanted sex with her
husband: she may consent to unwanted sex because she doesn’t want to lose him or
his affection, or because she doesn’t want to risk the fight that will ensue if she
doesn’t, or because she is afraid of his future violence if she withholds consent, or
because she wishes to keep domestic peace in her household if they cohabitate, or to
protect her children from her his anger. A young woman or girl not involved in a
long term relationship, may also consent to heterosexual sex she doesn’t want for
other reasons as well, not so obviously or so often shared with married women: she
may consent to unwanted sex because she wrongly believes, out of simple naivete,
that the sex is unstoppable or “unavoidable” once her partner is aroused, or because
she pities or likes her partner, or to impress her friends, or for the approval of or
admission to a peer group, or, of course, because she thinks she needs to do so in
order to get a good grade (or a raise) she may or may not deserve. According to a
growing consensus among sex researchers, unwanted consensual sex, no matter
how motivated, is extraordinarily common among sexually active young teenage
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girls, and among a surprisingly high percentage of sexually active young teenage
boys as well. 111 They differ on the likelihood of the various motivations, but
seemingly concur on the frequency of unwanted sex itself.
And, in the last fifteen years, social work and sociology scholars have also
(and finally – this is overdue) begun to look at some of the harms caused by the
sufferance of unwanted consensual sex, at least among college age women -- as
opposed to the harms caused by nonconsensual sex, or rape, which has been the
subject of intense and extensive study for at least fifty years. The work is in its
infancy, but it is growing. And, according to those studies, young, college-age
women who engage in unwanted but consensual sex disproportionately suffer from
depression and related psychological and emotional harms, they are less likely to
use or insist upon birth control, so more likely to also suffer unwanted pregnancies,
they have reduced self esteem and sexual agency. 112 These harms, furthermore, are
likely to be long-lasting, they don’t continue only for the duration of the sex itself, or
the sexual relationship. There is also a fair amount of scholarship from scholars in
social work, on the psychological, emotional, and also physical harms of the
phenomenologically consensual sex (meaning, sex that would clearly count as
consensual but for the age of the girls and boys involved) engaged in by younger
girls and boys both, in high school and middle school.
The empirical research is welcome and overdue, but it is also still limited,
both in terms of the number of such studies, but also in its scope and depth. In
particular, along with a number of feminist philosophers and some legal
theorists, 113 I have argued at length elsewhere 114 that all of that unwanted
consensual sex -- what Shari Motro calls “Sex Against Desire,” (or SAD, for short) -regardless of the age of the women or girls who engage in it, might carry distinctly
psychic and even political harms, in addition to the emotional harms to self esteem
and health that have been studied to date. Those political and psychic harms, as far
as I can tell, at least thus far have not been so closely studied by either social
scientists or social workers, although they are obliquely evidenced in one quite
extraordinary unpublished qualitative study of unwanted sex by a Marxist-feminist
111
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scholar, 115 and, much more explicitly, in some feminist memoirs. 116 As I have
characterized them, the psychic or political harms of unwanted sex echo the harms
discussed above of unwanted pregnancies. First, like the woman who carries an
unwanted pregnancy, a woman or a girl’s physical integrity and her sense of herself
as having physical integrity, is invaded when she opens herself up, physically and
literally, to penile penetrative sex she does not want and does not find pleasurable.
Her body becomes, to that degree, fluid, or porous: she views her own body as
boundaryless in ways that are inconsistent with – I think violently inconsistent with
-- the conception of the boundaried body so central to liberal theory. 117 Second, and
again like the woman who bears an unwanted pregnancy, a woman or girl who
consents to unwanted sex compromises her self-sovereignty: she willfully
subjugates her body and her will to someone else’s. She acts in ways inconsistent
with her own desire, and not in furtherance of her own pleasure. Again, the “self”
she creates through these choices is in sharp contrast to the willing, choosing, and
preferring “self” assumed by but also partly constructed by liberalism, who
relentlessly chooses based on preferences that in turn track the subject’s own,
rather than another’s, pleasures and pains. Her autonomy is likewise stunted, when
she subordinates her own ends to those of another, and her self possession is
threatened, when she applies her body to the work of providing a vehicle for
someone else’s pleasure. 118 And lastly, her own moral integrity is undermined, if
she lies to her partner and herself about her own pleasures or reasons for
consenting to the sex she doesn’t want. Physical integrity, autonomy, selfsovereignty, self-possession and integrity are all central components of the liberal,
political self. When women and girls willfully relinquish them in their sexual lives,
they are in effect relinquishing their entitlement to the enjoyment as well as the
challenges of that widely lauded as well as widely expected -- and intensely political
-- way of being in the social world.
Although there isn’t much empirical scholarship on this, again, there is some,
particularly regarding the harmful effects unwanted consensual sex on college
campuses. There is much less empirical scholarship – I can’t find any -- on either the
emotional or the political harms suffered by married women, older women, or
simply women in long term relationships (rather than college students in short term
relationships) who routinely and over time – sometimes over the course of an entire
adult lifetime -- consent to unwanted and unpleasurable sex. It does though seem
fair to infer that if college women are harmed, either emotionally or politically, by
occasional unwanted sex, then such women are likely harmed all the more
profoundly. A married woman’s physical integrity – her ownership of her body’s
boundaries -- is obviously far more severely compromised, if she quite literally and
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routinely and even as a matter of self identity opens up her body in service of
another’s pleasures, will, and ends. That permeable, fluid body, after all, defines her
adult body, not just her occasional participation in casual sex. 119 Likewise, a
married woman’s agency and sense of agency will be even more badly compromised
than the college student’s, if the wife routinely, and over years, puts her self and her
body to the work of participating in an action she does not want. It is hard to
imagine a healthy sense of one’s own agency either developing or being sustained
over the course of an adult life in which a woman as a matter of identity and habit
bends her will regarding her own body for the sake of another’s physical
pleasure. 120 The same is true of a married woman’s moral integrity, and a wife’s
overall sense of selfhood. The “self” as understood by liberal thought -- meaning a
self that both constitutes and asserts a unity of choice, desire, pleasure and
preference – one might think, could be badly diminished, in those marriages or long
term relationships in which a woman routinely and over years acts and chooses to
act, not on the basis of her own pleasures, preferences and desires, but on the basis
of and reflecting the pleasures, desires and preferences of her partner.
What I want to stress, that I believe goes beyond the claims made in the
empirical literature, is that the harms to selfhood sustained either occasionally by
young women or over time by older women, could and should be characterized as at
least potentially political, and not just psychic or emotional. A woman who
routinely engages in unpleasant, unpleasurable, unwanted and unwelcome sexual
intercourse, even if consensual, and whether or not marital, might come to regard
herself, and others may regard her likewise, as being in effect the “kind of person”
who has no physical integrity, and who might of course have pleasures and pains but
whose pleasures and pains are irrelevant or marginal to her body’s actions, and who
may have and act on her own choices, but whose choices do not reflect her own
desires, and who obviously has a body, but one which exists for the purpose of
another’s sexual fulfillment. As this becomes normalized and routinized, she may
become that much less of a “liberal subject”: a person who is prepared and
presumed to interact in a world in which a subject’s consent to actions, trades,
bargains and institutions track the subject’s preferences and her desires. She
consents to all this sex, but that consent -- her consent -- does not, at least in a very
important dimension of her life, track her own preferences and desires, rather than
her partner’s. This is a distinctive and quite different political harm than the harm
done to a woman who has been raped: the woman who consents to unwanted sex is
On the fluidity and boundary-lessness of women’s bodies, see ANDREA DWORKIN,
INTERCOURSE (New York: Free Press, 1988) and EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE
ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
120 On the importance of agency and a sense of agency to a woman’s wellbeing and
equality, see Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on
Self-Direction, 40 WM, & MARY L. REV. 805, 824-831 (1999).
Agency emerged as a central dimension of women’s equality in the 1990s, but as far
as I know, agency has not been linked to women’s engagement in unwanted sex, in
the way I have asserted in the text.
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acting and experiencing herself as acting in a way that is contrary to the unity that
we assume in the liberal self – a unity of desire and preference and choice, or act.
The political harm of consensual unwanted sex, then, if this is right, is that the
woman or girl’s capacity to live as a “liberal self” is badly undercut. Quite plausibly,
although again there’s no research on this, at least that I can find, that might in turn
limit both her viability and her potency in a liberal world hardly designed to
accommodate someone so constituted. Consequently, she becomes an illiberal
subject in a liberal world. It may not be quite so surprising that such illiberal women
in liberal societies have a greater tendency toward self-abnegation, self denial,
sacrifice and altruism than their more atomistic husbands, brothers, fathers and
sons. It may not be so surprising, even, that they don’t raise their hands in law
school classes very often and that they aren’t very adept at bargaining for a decent
price when buying a used car. 121 All of that unwanted sex to which they consent
might be part of the problem, and for that reason alone, if no other, it should count
as a harm. Again, the libertarian’s valorization of autonomous sex is seemingly blind
to it.
And finally, the libertarian’s blanket celebration of autonomous and nonprocreative sex covers not only harmful unwanted sex, but it also covers the
autonomous sex, whether wanted or not, that leads to unwanted pregnancies: those
pregnancies that occur when birth control fails, or -- what is far more frequent –
pregnancies that occur when it is not used because of oversight, ignorance,
unavailability, or because of a moral belief in its wrongfulness. Unwanted
pregnancies themselves, as argued above and as widely acknowledged, are clearly
harmful in some recognized and objective ways: An unwanted pregnancy that may
result from autonomous sex, no less than an unwanted pregnancy that may result
from marital sex, may be carried to term, if the woman is opposed to or cannot
afford an abortion or cannot access one, or it may be aborted, but either way, the
pregnancy carries with it severe financial and health risks. Shari Motro has
persuasively argued that these costs should be shared between the partners,
whether they are cohabitating or casual. 122 As with marital unwanted pregnancies,
though, unwanted pregnancies caused by autonomous sex also carry the less
recognized or at least less theorized psychic and political harms discussed above:
an unwanted pregnancy, unlike a wanted pregnancy, is an unwelcome intrusion into
and upon a woman’s body by the life and needs of another human being, with
attendant, and unwelcome, limits on her mobility, challenges to her health, and
truncation of her self-possession, autonomy and self-sovereignty. Her body exists,
against her desires, for the interests of another, and her will follows suit.
Sexual libertarians obviously recognize at least some of the harms
occasioned by unwanted pregnancies. Indeed, recognition of those harms is central
to both the libertarian’s argument for the right to use birth control and their
argument for its dispensation: pregnancy and the fear of pregnancy inhibit
Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a
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autonomous sex, autonomous sex is a natural good, and birth control is therefore of
great instrumental value. And, the sexual libertarian argument for birth control –
that birth control is of value because it facilitates autonomous sex – is often
intertwined with the (quite different) liberal and feminist argument that I will
endorse below, that birth control is of value, primarily, because it facilitates control
of fertility. But what sexual libertarians have not done -- nor have liberal feminists,
at least that that I can find -- is argue that the morality of autonomous sex, because
of the pregnancy to which it may lead, is, precisely because of that risk, not
unconditional. Nowhere, that I have found, in libertarian, liberal or feminist
arguments for either birth control or for legal abortion, is there even a suggestion
that in the absence of reliable birth control, parties simply should not have sex.
Nowhere in that voluminous literature is there a suggestion that uncontracepted
autonomous sex, even if fully consensual, is both unwise and immoral, if the parties
do not want to conceive. And accordingly, nowhere in liberal, liberal feminist or
libertarian arguments for birth control or legal abortion, is any of the burden or
blame for the unwanted pregnancy placed upon the consenting, autonomous parties
themselves. Nowhere is there a suggestion that by virtue of having sex when the are
knowingly risking an unwanted pregnancy, that they have therefore done
something which is immoral or wrongful. Weirdly, all these unwanted pregnancies
are immaculate conceptions: maybe they are harmful, but if they are, the sex is not
to blame, rather, the law is.
This is a profound, and striking, lack. It has two consequences. The first is
simply that because of it, the liberals, liberal feminists, and sexual libertarians who
have all argued strenuously for a right to use birth control, and for its availability,
through insurance and otherwise, have not argued for the existence of a moral duty
to use it. They have not argued that the use of contraception is a condition of the
morality of autonomous sex where conception is unwanted, nor have they argued in
the alternative, so to speak, that if contraception is not available, that there is a duty
then not to have the sex that might lead to it. I will return to this below. But
second, and more broadly, that the almost quintessentially liberal and libertarian
celebration of autonomous sex – a celebration of sex that does on occasion lead to
unwanted pregnancies -- has been subjected to virtually no intra-liberal criticism in
the legal literature of which I’m aware, and almost none elsewhere. Liberal and
libertarian arguments for the right to use birth control and now for a governmental
obligation to make it available through health plans are ubiquitous. Arguments that
the morality of autonomous sex where conception is not a desired outcome is fully
dependent upon the responsible use of that birth control – and hence for either a
duty and not just a right to either use birth control or not have sex, when either or
both parties do not wish conception to result – are virtually nonexistent. Quite the
contrary in fact: the relative availability of birth control and abortion have ironically
deepened – not conditioned – the unqualified liberal valorization of autonomous
sex. The sheer number of unwanted pregnancies that are its result, where birth
control for whatever reason is not used or not used correctly, has not – with the
exception of liberal endorsement of sex education campaigns that include
information about birth control, as a partial solution to the perceived problem of
teen pregnancies -- appreciably lessened the ardor with which the case is made.
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Now, by contrast, and it’s a vivid contrast, the harm of the unwanted
pregnancy itself is not at all invisible to the liberal imagination. In fact, at least two
prominent liberal legal scholars – Jed Rubenfeld from Yale Law School and Andrew
Koppelman, from Northwestern -- have argued over the last fifteen years that the
harm of unwanted pregnancy is so profound as to be akin to the harms of slavery. In
fact, for just that reason, Andrew Koppelman has argued that Roe v Wade might be
best defended as a Thirteenth, rather than Fourteenth Amendment decision. I think
both Rubenfeld and Koppelman’s arguments are powerful, and largely persuasive:
along with Eileen McDonagh’s important work From Choice to Consent from the
1990s, and Judith Thompson’s early 1970s philosophical defense of abortion, the
Rubenfeld-Koppelman analogy captures better than most, the severity and the
profundity of the harms occasioned by unwelcome or unwanted pregnancies.
Nevertheless, what both Rubenfeld and Koppelman infer from their analogy of
pregnancy to slavery, is not the wrongfulness of the autonomous sex that risks
occasioning this crippling, enslaving harm. Rather, what both men infer from the
harms they recognize in an unwanted pregnancy is the wrongfulness not of the sex
that risks it, but of laws that would criminalize abortion. Morally speaking, the sex
itself, for both theorists, gets off scot free: for both, its not the sex that is wrongful, or
the decision to engage in it, it’s the laws prohibiting abortion that are to blame. This
is logically peculiar if nothing else. Surely the sex itself, and the decision to engage
in it, and not just anti-abortion laws, is at least complicit in causing all those
unwanted pregnancies, and the misery they in turn entail.
So, finally, why? Why are the harms of autonomous sex – both the harms of
unwanted sex itself and the harms of autonomous sex, whether wanted or not, that
leads to unwanted pregnancies -- so invisible within the liberal conception of
heterosexual morality? Why are those harms so invisible to the “liberal
imagination”? I think there are a host of reasons, some of which have nothing to do
with sex or pregnancy, but rather are central to liberalism, or to some of its variants.
First, and as I’ve argued briefly above, and elsewhere at length, the very idea of
“consensual harms,” in some economically grounded versions of liberalism, is
virtually oxymoronic: consent is widely regarded within economic liberal theory as
the mechanism by which value is created, with the unfortunate consequence that
consensuality is viewed as in effect precluding the visibility of harms that may be
caused by any consensual transaction. 123 Pareto optimal transactions just can’t be
harmful, and consensual sex, whatever else it is, is pareto optimal. Consensuality is
also central, though, to some libertarian as well as liberal feminist understandings of
autonomy: the free or autonomous individual, for the libertarian, simply is the
individual who chooses between options, whether in economic or political or
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intimate markets. For non-economic libertarians, then, consent is emblematic of as
well as constitutive of autonomy; consent itself is a sort of intrinsic as well as
instrumental good. If consensual transactions are intrinsically good, then obviously
the same is true of consensual sexual transactions. Increasing the number and
availability of opportunities for consensual sexual transactions increases not only
the wealth of the world, as per the economic legalist, but the autonomy of the world
likewise, as per the libertarian.
Sex, however, is also distinctively and peculiarly valorized within
contemporary liberalism across the board, and so autonomous sex is all the more so:
autonomous sex combines the value of consensuality with the value of sex. Sex, in
the “liberal imagination,” to borrow the expression from Stephen Macedo and
Bradley and George’s exchange, 124 and as Tom Grey argued some time ago, 125 is
decidedly not the product of “dark forces,” the repression of which makes
civilization itself possible. Rather, sex, quintessentially, in the modern liberal
imagination, is about as non-Freudian as sex can possibly be: sex, contra Freud, is
expressive, private, universal, a matter of taste, generative of pleasure, and imposes
no or few costs on others. Sexual moralisms that assume to the contrary have
imposed irrational and profound harms on vast swaths of the community, and for no
sensible reason – as modern or contemporary liberals from Bertrand Russell 126 to
H.L.A. Hart 127 to Michel Foucault 128 to David Richards 129 and to Stephen Macedo 130
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have all in different ways argued. So long as consensual, there simply are no
further conditions for the morality of autonomous sexuality. So, the idea that sex
also ought to be mutually desired as well as mutually consensual – not only in the
workplace but everywhere – just doesn’t enter the picture. Consent is moral
condition enough. The harm, then, of unwanted but consensual sex is invisible, or at
best made grey, to the sexual libertarian, no less than is the harm of unwanted
marital sex to the natural lawyer.
But what of the unwanted pregnancies to which all that autonomous sex
leads? If unwanted pregnancy is wrong, and so wrong to be tantamount to slavery,
then why isn’t the heterosexual sex that causes it at least sometimes, and at least
partly, to blame? Neither Koppelman nor Rubenfeld provide much by way of
argument for their refusal to hold sex accountable. They do both suggest, though,
albeit for the most part in footnotes and only very briefly, that to “blame the sex” -to suggest that the sex, and the assumption of the risk of pregnancy the decision to
have sex entails -- rather than the laws that criminalize abortion – for the imposition
of unwanted pregnancy (which, again, for both theorists, is tantamount to slavery)
would be to wrongly suggest, or imply, that sex should be foregone where it would
risk pregnancy. To blame the sex, rather than laws against abortion, for the
unwanted pregnancy which sex occasions, would be in effect, to counsel for sexual
abstinence. And that, they both say, is unrealistic, undesirable, or both. Sex is, first,
just too good to be foresworn: to go through life without sex, Koppelman argues in a
footnote, is simply unimaginable (although it isn’t clear why he jumps to the lifelong part). Aside from its goodness, though, it is unrealistic to suggest that sex that
might lead to an unwanted pregnancy should be foresworn: sex is inevitable. Sex is
the result of forces – not the dark forces of Freudian imaginings, but forces
nevertheless. They are quite literally impossible to control. Sex is unstoppable.
There’s no point in blaming the sex. The sex is going to happen regardless.
By virtue of this (I think) somewhat juvenile insistence, both theorists, I
imagine unwittingly, thereby underscore radical feminist skepticism about the
motivation behind liberal arguments for abortion and birth control generally: that
the availability of abortion is attractive to liberal men mostly because it frees
women’s bodies for male sexual use. Both theorists also give support to the
purportedly “false beliefs” of teenage girls referenced above, as those beliefs have
been uncovered by social science researchers: that they may as well consent to sex
with an aroused partner even if they don’t want it because the sex is inevitable in
any event. Both Koppelman and Rubenfeld suggest, I suppose inadvertently, that
those teenage girls are right: that the sex will indeed “simply happen” – because of
those strong forces we can’t control -- if men will it to. The best that the state can
do, then, if we take the teenage girls’ beliefs on this score to be true, is to handle the
fallout, which we can do by making abortions safe, legal and available. If we want to
do something about the undesirability of the unwanted pregnancies that are the
fully predictable consequence of sex that is inevitable (whether or not desired), the
thing to do is to legalize, and then constitutionalize, the right to abortion. The
rather different idea that we should respond to the specter of unwanted pregnancy
by imposing upon the parties who want to have sex but who don’t want to conceive,
a duty to either use contraception responsibly or not have sex, would unfairly, or
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unrealistically, or both, limit the sexual franchise. With abortion made safe, legal
and available, there is, apparently, no reason to further condition the morality of
heterosexual sex, even if the consequence of all that sex, for some women, in the
absence of a right to an abortion, is a lived condition that is tantamount to slavery.
Let me close this section with a thumbnail assessment of the costs and
benefits of the sexual libertarian’s brief for birth control. Surely social conservatives
and natural lawyers are right that the liberal’s valorization of autonomous sex which
underlies their brief for birth control, and which has so permeated both our legal
and popular culture, translates into more and freer sexual expression. And, surely
liberals and sexual libertarians are right that more and freer sexual expression adds
value immeasurably to many people’s lives: same sex couples who wish to marry
may do so, unmarried individuals of any gender can have sex and can have children
without fear of moral censure, and without visiting any sins on their children’s
shoulders, and, with the responsible use of birth control, heterosexual individuals
and married couples both can enjoy sexual expression without fear of unwanted
reproductive consequences. The libertarian’s valorizing claim that supports the
distribution of birth control also means, though, that there is more unwanted sex in
the world than there might be otherwise. That should count as a cost of the
argument, whether or not a cost of birth control, and it is a cost entirely
unacknowledged by libertarians themselves. And finally, the celebration of
autonomous sex that underlies the case for birth control, where birth control is not
used or is misused, either from moral conviction, ignorance, or recklessness, also,
then, contributes to the sufferance of unwanted pregnancies. Yet as argued above,
the libertarian brief for birth control falls far short of an endorsement of an
argument for a duty – rather than simply a right -- to use it. Even assuming that
birth control brings down the number of unwanted pregnancies, then, the brief for
the availability of birth control implied by the valorizing claim, may perversely
increase the number of unwanted pregnancies over what it might have been
without that valorizing claim. All of that unwanted sex and all of those unwanted
pregnancies impose harms, and they are harms which liberals and sexual
libertarians ought to at least acknowledge, and ought to try to counter.
The libertarian brief for birth control, and particularly its valorizing claim,
once we account for those harms, is a decidedly mixed blessing. Obviously, birth
control itself brings down the overall number of unwanted pregnancies from what it
would be in a world in which the valorizing claim regarding sex had taken hold but
without the technologies of reliable birth control. What’s not so clear is whether it
brings that overall number down below what it would be in a world in which the
technologies are available and the valorizing claim had not taken hold. But
whatever one might think of any of that, birth control itself surely doesn’t bring
down the overall number to the degree it would, were its use argued as a duty, and
not just a right, by its most ardent defenders. And, obviously, birth control itself
doesn’t ameliorate at all the harms of the unwanted sex that the sexual libertarian’s
conception of sexual morality valorizes. Particularly when combined with the
ideological and dogmatically valorizing conception of the value of autonomous sex
that has fueled its availability, birth control might in fact worsen those harms.
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The libertarian brief for birth control, no less than the natural lawyer’s brief
against it, is premised on a conception of heterosexual morality that runs roughshod
over women’s desires and women’s pleasures both: the natural law conception does
so by valorizing marital sex and the unwanted pregnancies it causes, and the
libertarian’s does so by valorizing autonomous sex, whether or not unwanted, and
whether or not pleasurable, and by refusing to condition the morality of even
wanted and pleasurable autonomous sex on the responsible use of birth control.
Both natural lawyers and libertarians, in brief, valorize either pregnancies, or sex, or
both, regardless of women’s desire or lack of desire.
Does this matter? The celebration of unwanted but autonomous or marital
sex, as well as unwanted but intentional pregnancy, may be unfortunate, if all of that
unwanted sex and all of those unwanted pregnancies are themselves harms,
whether those harms are best characterized as political, economic, or emotional.
But those harms cannot in any obvious way ground lawsuits or crimes, beyond the
degree to which the harms from unwanted sex in the workplace might translate into
financial loss, which may sometimes be partially recoverable in sexual harassment
lawsuits, or, perhaps, the harms from unwanted pregnancies might translate into
financial loss that could at least theoretically be recoverable in the sorts of claims
which Shari Motro envisions. Nevertheless, those harms, including the psychic and
political harms occasioned by both unwanted sex and unwanted pregnancy, should
be acknowledged and minimized. Instead, they are multiplying, so to speak, on our
watch. And, they are brought on or intensified by one or the other of two
conceptions of heterosexual morality to which almost all of us have more or less
signed on, at least in the legal academy. The end of the conclusion that follows
comments briefly on how we might ameliorate the damage we’ve wrought.
Conclusion
Let me recapitulate. Our contemporary legal and constitutional struggles
over birth control have bizarrely rendered invisible the competing conceptions of
heterosexual morality that frame at least some of the arguments for or against its
legality and accessibility. Those conceptions, however, as well as the arguments
regarding birth control that presuppose them, stand in need of critique. The natural
lawyer’s claim that birth control is immoral rests (in part) on a conception of
heterosexual morality that unqualifiedly celebrates both procreative marital sex,
and the pregnancies that sex causes, as intrinsic goods, regardless of whether they
are wanted, while the libertarian claim that birth control is of great instrumental
value – so great that its use should be constitutionally protected and its availability
guaranteed -- rests on a conception of heterosexual morality that celebrates
autonomous sex, and again regardless of the presence or absence of desire. These
two views of course entail starkly opposing conclusions about the value of birth
control: for the natural lawyer, birth control frustrates the natural good of
procreative marital sex, and therefore should be banned or discouraged (and
certainly should not be supplied by employers), and for the libertarian, birth control
instrumentally frees the natural good of autonomous sex from the constraints of
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both reproduction and fears of it, and therefore should be made widely available.
But that stark contrast and the bitter debate it has engendered masks an awful lot of
shared ground, and a whole lot more than either side recognizes. To put it crudely,
both the natural lawyer and the libertarian’s arguments regarding birth control are
premised on conceptions of sex that are (at least in part) profoundly “pro-sex:” the
first is pro-“sex of the reproductive form,” and the second is pro-“autonomous sex.”
The first views birth control as antithetical to the sex it valorizes, the second views
birth control as instrumentally necessary for it. But both views rest on the
valorization or celebration of a large swath of sexual behavior.
And, both conceptions, as well as the arguments for or against birth control
they respectively imply, are problematic for just that reason: not because of what
they censor, but because of what they dogmatically celebrate. Neither marital sex
on the one hand, nor autonomous sex on the other, are unalloyed, unconditional,
natural or intrinsic human goods. For either marital or autonomous sex to be good
(as well as pleasurable), both the sex and the pregnancies that may follow must be
not only mutually consensual but also mutually wanted. The celebration of what is
often assaultive and aggressive, but minimally unwelcome, behavior by both camps
pulls within their respective tents of moral approbation an awful lot of unwanted
sex and a lot of unwanted pregnancies, and all of their attendant harms. That the
argument over birth control has shielded all of this from critical scrutiny is itself a
cost of the way we – meaning lawyers -- have framed that conflict.
Neither the “reproductive form” nor “consent” is a sufficient condition for
the morality of sex. Neither marriage nor the “marital form” of the sex that occurs
within it guarantees that sex is mutually desired. But consent doesn’t guarantee
desire either: the current liberal and liberal feminist campaigns to clarify the
consent standard with “yes means yes” and “no means no” rules of construction, for
example, don’t in any way imply that the sex to which a fully verbal and unequivocal
yes is given, is actually wanted. In fact, one cost (there may be others) of the focus
on “yes means yes” in our current conversations about rape is simply that it
obscures this fact: the problem many women, and particularly young women, face
with respect to sexuality, is not that a man understands her passive acquiescence to
sex as a yes while she understands it as a no, but rather, that she say “yes” so
frequently – passively and actively both -- to sex that she does not truly desire and
does not want and from which she will take no pleasure. That problem is hardly
clarified, and in fact it is obscured – and badly -- by “yes means yes” and “no means
no” campaigns. Likewise, though, abstinence-only campaigns, pushed aggressively
whether or not successfully by moral conservatives as the best way to deal with
social problems attendant to sex outside of marriage, don’t in any way guarantee
that the sex inside traditional marriages of the approved and celebrated
reproductive form is also wanted. And, in fact, they obfuscate that problem, and for
exactly the same reason: that a woman abstains from premarital sex doesn’t mean
that she wants particular sexual acts that occur within her marriage. The same is
true of women’s desires, pleasures, and interests with respect to pregnancy:
pregnancies that result from either autonomous or marital sex can be unwanted, and
when they are, they are harmful. Yet, women’s sexual and reproductive desires,
women’s sexual and reproductive pleasures, and to a stunning degree women’s
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sexual and reproductive interests, are simply irrelevant to the two conceptions of
the morality of heterosexual sex that continue to define the poles of our culturalsexual debates around birth control.
There is now little doubt that marriage does indeed make us happier, richer,
healthier, and more long-lived, and it makes our children’s lives happier, richer,
healthier and more long-lived as well, as the institution of marriage’s defenders and
celebrants have long insisted. 131 Social conservatives have largely won the
argument for the social utility of marriage, as the equal rights campaign for samesex marriage indirectly and perhaps to some degree unintentionally underscores.
There is also now little doubt that the liberal’s censorial claim regarding the
necessity of consent to moral sex is a major advance for liberalism and women both.
Non-consensual sex is indeed always wrong (whether or not it is also always rape),
and it is wrong whether or not the victim was a sex worker, whether or not she
actively resisted, whether or not there was force employed, whether or not the
parties were on a date, and whether or not they were married. Liberals have won
that argument, and we’re all -- but particularly women -- the better off for it.
Nevertheless, neither consent nor marriage is sufficient to guarantee that sex is
truly moral, no matter how consensual or how marital the sex. All sex, as well all
the pregnancies all that sex sometimes causes, should be mutually wanted. When it
is not mutually desired, it is harmful, and when both parties know that it is not
desired by one or the other of them, it is immoral. A woman’s desire is a necessary
condition for the morality of the sex in which she engages, as well as for the morality
of the pregnancy and maternity that may result. Neither marriage nor consent
suffices.
The harms caused by deeply entrenched beliefs to the contrary should be
addressed. The natural lawyer’s conception of heterosexual morality – the blanket
valorization of all uncontracepted penetrative sex within marriage –also implicitly
valorizes unwanted sex and quite explicitly valorizes the unwanted pregnancies that
such sex (whether wanted or unwanted) may cause. To the extent that women live
their sexual married lives on the basis of that belief, all of that uncontracepted
marital sex presumably causes quite a few unwanted pregnancies. The libertarian’s
conception of heterosexual morality – the blanket valorization of all autonomous
heterosexual sex within or outside of marriage and the instrumental value attached
to birth control accordingly –also valorizes unwanted autonomous sex as well. To
the extent that women live their sexual lives on the basis of that liberal belief, all of
that autonomous sex, when unwanted, carries unreckoned harms in its wake.
Taking these harms seriously would require taking women’s desires seriously as a
moral condition of sex and reproduction both, whether inside marriage, with
respect to the natural law conception, or outside of it, as per the liberal. That might
be hard to do, in part, for the straightforwardly sexist reason that it is women more
often than not who bear the brunt of those harms. To counter them requires us to
reverse the course of millennia, and center rather than marginalize not just harms
borne peculiarly by women, but also women’s desires, including, most concretely,
For a full discussion, see ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEX AND GENDER (Boulder:
Paradigm Publishers 2007).
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women’s lack of desire, when they lack it, for heterosexual penetrative sex and for
pregnancy both.
It shouldn’t be so hard to do, though, either within a socially conservative
milieu that honors the dignity and the sanctity of both women’s and men’s bodies, or
in a liberal regime that honors their free will. The natural lawyer’s insistence on the
intrinsic moral value of heterosexual sex of the reproductive form could easily be
amended to accommodate this simple moral fact: whatever one might think of the
necessity of the reproductive form to moral sex and to the pregnancies that result –
leave that for another day – marriage and whatever “marital form” for sex one might
wish to specify are clearly not sufficient conditions for the morality of marital sex.
Mutual desire is a necessary condition of the morality of marital sex and of the
pregnancies to which that sex sometimes leads. A woman’s or a man’s lack of desire
for sex should be accorded moral veto power over the couple’s decision to have sex,
so as to minimize unwanted sex, and, ideally, birth control should be used
responsibly to minimize unwanted pregnancy. Even in a traditional relationship in
which the use of birth control (other than natural) is off the table on moral grounds,
however, the recognition of such a constraint would go some ways toward reducing
both the amount of unwanted sex and the number of unwanted pregnancies within
traditional marriages. A woman in an otherwise completely traditional marriage
who only has sex when she affirmatively desires it, and who, during the periods in
which she believes herself to be fertile, only when and if she also actively desires a
pregnancy (rather than when she is open to a risk), will have less unwanted sex and
fewer unwanted pregnancies simply by acting on those desires, and by insisting her
partner does likewise.
Just as clearly, the libertarian’s valorization of autonomous sex stands in
need of amendment: mutual desire, and not just consensuality, is a necessary moral
condition of both sex and the pregnancies that can result. Libertarians are surely
correct to believe that the morality of consensual sex does not depend upon the
marital status, or the gender, or the sexual orientation, much less the race or class of
the parties engaging in it. But it does depend on mutual desire. A woman or girl
who has consensual sex only when she feels a desire for it will have less unwanted
sex and suffer fewer of its attendant harms than a woman or girl who does not do so.
Likewise, a woman or girl who feels herself and her partner to be under a moral
duty to use contraception when she wants the sex but not the pregnancy that may
result, and has uncontracepted sex only when she affirmatively desires a pregnancy,
will suffer far fewer unwanted pregnancies. The woman or girl should act on those
desires, and insist her partner do so as well, inside as well as outside of marriage,
and no matter how a marriage is defined. Those are the behaviors we should be
actively encouraging, both for our children and for ourselves: you don’t just have a
right to birth control under the Constitution, or a right to its availability under the
ACA. You also have a moral duty to use it, or to abstain from sex if you do not want
to become pregnant. And whether or not you’re using birth control, you have a
moral duty to your present and future self not to have sex when you don’t want to,
and not to impose it on an unwanting – even if consenting -- partner. And, ought
does indeed imply can: sex in point of fact is not inevitable, even when hotly desired.
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With that straightforward change in consciousness – that amendment to our liberal
embrace of the positive value of autonomous sex -- we’d all be better off.
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